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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 Purpose  I
The purpose of this dissertation is to evaluate and analyse the test for the wrongful arrest of 
vessels and cargo, and the liability for the payment of damages consequent thereto. The 
primary focus of this study will be on vessels. The test for wrongful arrest was established 
over a century ago. It has been adapted and varied, with every jurisdiction having a variation 
of the test. While there are two international conventions in existence in respect of the arrest 
of vessels, neither appears to have given rise to a uniform approach. I am of the view that the 
test is anachronistic, in need of revision and no longer applies effectively in the present day.  
I will begin by explaining the test for wrongful arrest, and discuss its origins and 
history in the United Kingdom, the approach of both jurisdictions and how the test for 
wrongful arrest has been applied with a focus on common law jurisdictions.  The approach to 
the application and interpretation of this test differs markedly between the civil and common 
law jurisdictions, in the context of their adaptation of the test, and has contributed to the lack 
of uniformity in the application of the test. This factor has inevitably given rise to the practise 
of forum shopping by ship owners and charterers. 
There are two international Arrest Conventions in existence having come into being in 
1952 and 1999 respectively. Both Conventions have in effect left the resolution of this issue 
of the test for wrongful arrest to be dealt with by the lex fori. The Conventions have 
unfortunately not given rise to a situation where uniformity is a driving factor. 
The recognition of the need to reform the test for wrongful arrest of vessels is a long 
standing one, and, according to Sir Bernard Eder, he has campaigned for over thirty years for 
the reform of the test.
1
  
This dissertation also refers to the renewed campaign to reform the test for wrongful 
arrest of vessels, initiated by Professor Mandaraka-Sheppard,
2
 and recently debated between 
Sir Bernard Eder
3
 and Martin Davies.
4
 This campaign is not only in respect of reform in the 
United Kingdom but has recently given rise to a renewal of the campaign to implement 
reform by amending the 1999 Arrest Convention by way of a Protocol to the Convention. 
                                                 
 
1
 Eder (2013-2014) A Time for Change 113. 
2
 Mandaraka-Sheppard (2013) 41. 
3
 Eder (2013-2014) Wrongful Arrest of Ships Rejoinder 143. 
4
 Davies (2013-2014) 137.  
7 
The differing views, supporting justification, arguments in favour and against the 
reform of the test will be considered. Solutions as to how the test should be reformed, and 
other alternate options to determine malice and wrongfulness will also be considered. 
The argument will essentially be that when the test was first established, it was geared 
to address the challenges of a particular context in time, and now, not only is that context no 
longer in existence, but the test has created the perhaps unintended consequence of denying 
potential litigants access to courts, thus creating an inequitable and unjust situation. 
The work of the International Maritime Committee and the International Working 
Group on Wrongful Arrest of Vessels,
5
 will be considered, and reference made to the results 
of the Questionnaire issued by the International Maritime Committee and the role it seeks to 
play in achieving harmonisation of the law relating to wrongful arrest. 
Therefore, there are two aspects of relevance. The first is that the test in itself must be 
substantively reformed and the second is that this newly reformed test should be uniformly 
applied. 
In conclusion, based on the discussion of the issues above, I will affirm my view that 
the time has come for the revision of the test as it stands in respect of wrongful arrest, and 
further that this revision should be one that establishes uniformity and harmonisation in this 
area of the law. 
 Origins of the test in the United Kingdom II
The concept of wrongful arrest and the test to determine the nature of the arrest whether 
wrongful or not was established in English law in the Privy Council decision of The 
Evangelismos,
6
 and followed in The Volant,
7
 and The Strathnaver.
8
 The court held: 
“It is urged by the Appellant that damages ought to have been awarded in addition to costs, 
according to the practice of the Admiralty Court, because the arrest was improper. On the other 
hand it is said that the arrest of the ship was the foundation of the action, and therefore was not 
an illegal or improper act. Their Lordships think that there is no reason in this case for giving 
damages. Undoubtedly, if the arrest of the ship is an act of mala fides, or of that crassa 
                                                 
 
5
 Berlingieri CMI Yearbook 2016 297. 
6
 (1858) 12 Moo PC 352 at 359 (The Evangelismos). This was followed in The Volant (1864) 167 ER 385 
(Adm), and The Strathnaver (1875) 1 App Cas 58 (PC). The Evangelismos decision was preceded by a number 
of similar cases which considered the concept of wrongful arrest, including The Orion (1852) 12 Moo 356, The 
Glasgow (1855) Swa 145, The Nautilus (1856) Swa 105, and The Gloria de Maria (1856) Swa 106. However, 
none of these decisions established a standard or test for wrongful arrest. It may be that it was not warranted that 
it be necessary to deal with for the purpose of the decision of the court at the time.  
7
 (1864) 167 ER 385 (Adm). 
8
 (1875) 1 App Cas 58 (PC). 
8 
negligentia from which the law implies malice, the Court of Admiralty would be justified in 
giving damages, as in an action brought at common law damages might be obtained. In the 
Admiralty Court however the proceeding is very convenient, because in the action in which the 
main question is disposed of damages may be awarded. 
The real question in this case comes to this: - Is there, or is there not, reason to say that the 
action was so unwarrantably brought, or brought with so little colour, so little foundation, that it 
implies malice on the part of the plaintiff, or that gross negligence which is equivalent to it? 
Their Lordships are of opinion that there is nothing whatever to establish the Appellant’s 
proposition. It is true the identity of the vessel was not proved; but there were circumstances 
which afforded ground for believing that the Evangelismos was really the vessel which came 
into collision with the Hind.”
9
 
This test is undoubtedly a part of English law, though the origin of the rule or test is 
unclear as is its basis or rationale.
10
 
The current position as outlined in the British Maritime Lawyers Association’s response 
to a CMI questionnaire on the implementation of the 1952 Convention is that a claimant will 
not be liable in damages for having arrested a vessel in the absence of proof of mala fides or 
gross negligence the claimant is not liable in damages for having arrested a vessel. This was 
established in The Evangelismos,
11
 and confirmed in The Strathnaver,
12
 and, most recently, in 
The Kommunar (No 3).
13
  
The three main approaches to the issue of damages for the wrongful arrest of ships are; 
first a narrow entitlement to damages based on the Admiralty decisions where mala fides or 
crassa negligentia must be demonstrated; secondly, a narrow entitlement to damages based 
upon the test of “reasonable and probable cause” from common law decisions; and lastly, the 
broader claim to damages in the civil legal systems where the arrest is unjustified.
14
  
With regard to the wording used in these approaches, mala fides will be accepted to 
exist in those cases where the arresting party has no honest belief in its entitlement to arrest 
the ship.
15
 Gross negligence arises in those instances where objectively there is so little basis 
                                                 
 
9
 The Evangelismos (1858) 12 Moo PC 352 at 359. 
10
 Eder 124. 
11
 (1858) 12 Moo PC 352. 
12
 [1875] 1 AC 58. 
13
 Centro Latino Americano De Commercio Exterior SA v Owners of The Ship Kommunar (The ‘Kommunar’) 
(No 3) [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 22 (QBD) (The Kommunar (No 3)). 
14
 Woodford 146. 
15
 The Kommunar (No 3) 30. 
9 
for the arrest that it may be inferred that the arrestor did not believe in its entitlement to arrest 
the ship, or acted without any serious regard to whether there were adequate grounds for the 
arrest of the vessel.
16
 Unless a ship owner can prove the narrow category of wrongful arrest, 
it may find it difficult to obtain a remedy. There is no question of damages being awarded for 




                                                 
 
16
 The Kommunar (No 3) 30 
17
 BMLA Response to CMI Questionnaire re Implementation of 1952 Convention, accessed 21 August 2017 
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CHAPTER 2 APPLICATION OF THE TEST 
 Introduction I
A ship owner may be faced with substantial financial loss when a ship is arrested when it 
should not have been. The question is whether damages are recoverable to compensate the 
ship owner for those losses and the answer to this depends on whether the ship owner can 
establish that the conduct of the arresting party in arresting the vessel was effected mala fides 
or crassa negligentia.
18
 The wrongful arrest of a vessel is regarded as an arrest founded on a 
claim which is rejected on its merits by the court, or, abandoned by the arresting party 
without reason or where the arrest is not undertaken for bona fide reasons.
19
 The issue is 




This question may be answered in the affirmative subject to the fulfilment of the test as 




 Three phases of development II
Three phases in the development of the test for wrongful arrest can identified, beginning with 
its establishment in The Evangelismos, and running through the decisions that emanated in 
the immediate period thereafter, to the most recent the decision in The Kommunar (No 3), and 
these three phases are traced in what follows. 
 The Evangelismos III
The starting point is the decision in The Evangelismos, and it is useful to provide context to 
consider the facts of the case which were that an unknown ship collided with the plaintiffs’ 
ship, The Hind, while at anchor. Despite pursuit of the ship responsible for the collision, it 
escaped. The following day, The Evangelismos was found in the docks and believed to be the 
colliding vessel and was subsequently arrested. At the trial, however, it was found to not be 
the ‘guilty’ vessel. The Evangelismos lay under arrest for three months, and after the outcome 
of the trial the vessel’s owners claimed damages for wrongful arrest. Damages for wrongful 
arrest were not awarded as the Court was of the view that the arrest had been made in the 
                                                 
 
18
 Meeson 133.  
19
 Meeson 133. 
20
 Meeson 133. 
21
 Meeson 133.  
11 
bona fide belief that The Evangelismos was the ship that had collided with The Hind and that 
there was no mala fides in the arrest. 
On appeal, the ship owner argued that the arrest was without probable cause. The ship 
owner faced a dual burden not only of proving mala fides but also the absence of reasonable 
and probable cause.
22
 No reason was evident to hold The Evangelismos liable as the ‘guilty’ 
ship. The arresting party averred that the arrest was made in good faith. The court found that 
the identity of the colliding ship was not proved but there were grounds to believe that The 
Evangelismos had collided with The Hind. The arrest was thus not wrongful and the arresting 
party was not liable in damages.
23
 
The Privy Council upheld the decision of the court a quo and rejected the ship owner’s 
argument.
24
 The ship owner was, despite his vessel being under arrest for three months, not 
even compensated for the legal costs incurred.
25
 
The test as stated in The Evangelismos is: 
‘is there or is there not, reason to say, that the action was so unwarrantably brought or 
brought with so little colour or so little foundation that it rather implies malice on the part 
of the Plaintiff, or gross negligence which is equivalent to it.’
26
 
The impact of these facts lies in that the case was not one where the claim against the 
ship was unsuccessful at trial, but a case where the arrest was brought against an ‘innocent’ 
ship. The notion of malice has been closely linked to the concept of the absence of reasonable 
or probable cause of action. The concept of the implication of malice as alluded to above is a 
matter for the judgment of the court and would have to be determined by a court taking into 
account the facts of each case. 
 After The Evangelismos IV
The principle in The Evangelismos was applied consistently through the late 1800s.
27
 In The 
Kate,
28
 the court drew an express analogy with the common law action of malicious 
prosecution:  
                                                 
 
22
 The Evangelismos (1858)12 Moo PC 352 at 356 
23
 The Evangelismos (1858)12 Moo PC 352 at 357  
24
 The Evangelismos (1858)12 Moo PC 352 at 359 
25
 The Evangelismos (1858) 12 Moo PC 352 at 359 
26
 The Evangelismos (1858) 12 Moo PC 352 at 359 
27
 See The Active (1862) 5 LT (NS) 773, The Eleonore (1863) Br & L 185, The Volant (1864) Br & L 321; 167 
ER 385 and The Cathcart (1867) LR 1 A&E 314, The Collingrove, The Numida (1885) 10 PD 158 and The 
Keroula (1886) 11 PD 92. 
28
 (1862) Br & L 218. 
12 
‘The defendants are not in my opinion entitled to damages, because the circumstances of 
the case do not shew on the part of the plaintiffs any mala fides or crassa negligentia, 
without which, according to The Evangelismos, unsuccessful plaintiffs are not to be 
mulcted in damages.’ 
Mala fides is defined generally as bad faith or malice.
29
 The test does not require both 
mala fides and crassa negligentia, but either one or the other; i.e. either mala fides or crassa 
negligentia.
30
 Crassa negligentia is regarded as gross negligence which implies malice, as is 
indicated in the following: 
‘gross negligence covers those situations where objectively there is so little basis for 
arrest that it may be inferred that the arrestor did not believe in its entitlement to arrest the 
ship or acted without any serious regard to whether there were adequate grounds for the 
arrest of the vessel.’
31
 
This approach was followed through in The Strathnaver,
32
 where it was held that no 
damages were payable as ‘there was simply an error in judgement in bringing the suit’. 
Despite the fact that the wrong vessel had been arrested, the court found that there was no 




 damages were awarded for the wrongful arrest where the vessel was 
arrested by the claimant of a mortgage bond before the debt was due. The court found that the 
plaintiffs had full knowledge of the facts and should have had regard to the terms of the 
mortgage agreement, from which it was clear that the debt was not due.
34
 The vessel was 
about to embark on a profitable voyage, and would have suffered loss consequent to the 
arrest. 
In The Walter D Wallet, the court found that the arresting party did exhibit mala fides 
and crassa negligentia in seizing the vessel and were accordingly found liable for damages.
35
 
The court held that the action while brought at common law applied the same principles as 
would have been applicable in the Admiralty Court: 
                                                 
 
29
 The Evangelismos (1858) Swa 378  381. 
30
 The Evangelismos (1858) Swa 378  381. 
31
 Berlingieri 253. 
32
 (1875) 1 App Cas 58 (PC). 
33
 (1867) LR 1 A & E 314. 
34
 (1867) LR 1 A & E 333 
35
 (1893) P 202 208. 
13 
‘Still, the action of the defendants was, I think, clearly in common law phrase, without 
reasonable or probable cause; or, in equivalent Admiralty language, the result of crassa 




In The Walter D Wallet,
37
 the vessel was alleged to have been wrongfully arrested by 
the defendants. The defendants had agreed to sell the vessel to the plaintiffs, subject to the 
condition that the policies of insurance covering the vessel on her voyage from London to 
Barry would be endorsed in favour of the sellers. Problems arose in respect of the policies 
and while the vessel was loading at Barry, the defendants communicated with their agent Mr 
Hamilton at Barry instructions that he was not to interfere with the loading but must arrange 
to stop the vessel from sailing without their authority.  
Hamilton had prior to the sale been a part owner of the vessel but had sold his share by 
the time of these events. He then issued a writ in an action of restraint as a co-owner and 
arrested the ship in the usual way. The Plaintiff argued that an action at common law for the 
arrest with nominal damages in respect of the infringement of the plaintiff’s right of 
possession; and that an application could be made on the same ground in an Admiralty 
proceeding for similar damages. The action turned on the fact that the writ issues was a writ 
in an action of restraint as a co-owner when Hamilton had seized to be a co-owner. 
The court used the concept of ‘without reasonable or probable cause’ which was 
borrowed from the common law malicious prosecution cases and was equated to crassa 
negligentia, and nominal damages were awarded for seizing the vessel.
38
 This matter 
involved an action in common law for the malicious arrest of a ship as distinct from an action 
in the Admiralty Court. The reference to the term ‘reasonable or probable cause’, does not 
appear to be an admiralty term but was in fact at the time a common law principle derived 
from the actions for malicious prosecutions of persons. 
The court was of the view that, ‘what was in consideration was not the appropriate test for 
wrongful arrest of a vessel but whether there was a right in common law to nominal damages for the 
malicious arrest of a vessel where no actual damage had been proved’.39  
                                                 
 
36
 (1893) P 202 208. 
37
 (1893) P 202 208.  
38
 (1893) P 202 208. 
39
 The Kiku Pacific [1999] SGCA 96.  
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 The Kommunar (No 3) V
In The Kommunar (No 3), it was held that where the arresting party held no honest belief in 
its entitlement to arrest the ship, mala fides must be found to exist.
40
 
The arresting party in The Kommunar (No 3) was well aware that the beneficial owners 
and the person in possession of the ship were, at the time the cause of action arose, a different 
entity from the owners of The Kommunar (No 3) at the time of the arrest, the owners did not 
succeed in its claim for damages, despite arguing that the conduct of the arrestor amounted to 
crassa negligentia. 
The court referred to the decision in The Evangelismos and interpreted the test as 
follows: 
‘Two types of cases are thus envisaged. Firstly, there are cases of mala fides which must 
be taken to mean those cases where on the primary evidence the arresting party has no 
honest belief in his entitlement to arrest the vessel. Secondly there are those cases in 
which objectively there is so little basis for the arrest that it may be inferred that the 
arresting party did not believe in his entitlement to arrest the vessel or acted without any 
serious regard to whether there were adequate grounds for the arrest of the vessel. It is in 
the latter sense that the phrase crassa negligentia and gross negligence are used and are 
described as implying malice or being equivalent to it.’
41
  
The court held that the difficulty in awarding damages, including wasted costs or other 
expenses incurred during a wrongful arrest, is inherent in the procedural rules of arrest of 
ships under English law. The reason why this is the position is due to the in rem jurisdiction 
of the Admiralty Court which requires no undertaking in damages from a claimant who 
obtains the benefit of security for his claim by arresting a vessel even if the jurisdiction has 
been wrongfully invoked. 
The court held that: 
‘Even if the plaintiff’s claim fails or he is found to have wrongly invoked the jurisdiction 
he will not have to compensate the ship owner for the expenses and losses arising out of 
the arrest unless mala fides or crass negligentia is proved. This is a rule of English law 
which can bear very harshly on ship owners’ who for some special reason may be unable 
to obtain release of their vessel by putting up security. It is not a rule which is found in 
the civil law systems. The more widely used procedure for obtaining security for a claim 
in personam in English law is the Mareva injunction, but there is an undertaking in 
                                                 
 
40
 [1997] 1 Lloyds Rep 22 (QBD) 30. 
41
 (1997) 1 Lloyds Rep 22 QBD 30. 
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damages required and the liability in respect of that undertaking arises upon the basis that, 




The absence of a similar facility in Admiralty proceedings in rem may thus leave 
without remedy an innocent defendant ship owner who has suffered loss by an unjustifiable 
arrest but who is unable to establish malice or crassa negligentia.
43
 
While recognizing the injustice borne by the ship-owner the judge did not however 
deem it appropriate to exercise his discretion to allow a reduction of the ship owner’s 
recoverable costs incurred due to the wrongful arrest, in order to give credit for the benefit of 
the bunkers remaining on board. This case did present an opportunity for the test to be 
revised but the court did not avail itself to this end. 
Colman J in his judgement held that whether the conduct in The Kommunar amounted 
to crassa negligentia or not, it was not possible to say that it should have been obvious to the 
arresting party or their legal advisors that the claim in England was bound to fail taking into 
consideration the privatisation process and the complexity of Russian legislation.
44
 
The court was of the view that the difficulty in granting damages, including wasted 
costs or other expenses incurred during wrongful arrest is, 
‘inherent in the procedural rules of the arrest of ships under English law … because the in 
rem jurisdiction of the Admiralty court requires no undertaking in damages from a 
plaintiff who obtains the benefit of security for his claim by arresting a vessel, even if he 
has wrongfully invoked the jurisdiction’. 
45
 
It is very difficult for a ship owner to obtain a remedy unless it is able to prove 
wrongful arrest, and the decision in The Kommunar (No 3) showed how difficult it is for the 
owner to succeed in its claim for damages for wrongful arrest.
46
 
Unfortunately, there is no question of damages being awarded for unjustified arrest 
merely because the claim failed on its merits. Following the decision in The Walter D Wallet 
and The Kommunar (No 3), the courts have continued to apply the test set out in The 
Evangelismos.  
                                                 
 
42
 The Kommunar (No 3) [1997] 1 Lloyds Rep 22 33. 
43
 The Kommunar (No 3) (1997) 1 Lloyds Rep 22 33. 
44
 The Kommunar (No 3) (1997) 1 Lloyds Rep 22 33. 
45
 Mandaraka-Sheppard vol 1 at 164. 
46
 Mandaraka-Sheppard vol 1 at 174. 
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The court, in The Kommunar (No 3),
47
 citing the decision in The Evangelismos as 
regulating the recovery of damages for wrongful arrest, identified the following two 
principles: 
‘Firstly there are cases of mala fides, which must be taken to mean those cases where on 
the primary evidence the arresting party has no honest belief in his entitlement to arrest 
the vessel. Secondly there are those cases in which objectively there is so little basis for 
the arrest that it may be inferred that the arresting party did not believe in his entitlement 
to arrest the vessel or acted without serious regard to whether there were adequate 
grounds for the arrest of the vessel. It is, as I understand the judgement in the latter sense 
that such a phrase as “crassa negligentia” and “gross negligence” is used and are 
described as implying malice or being equivalent to it.’
48
 
According to Cremean, the terms ‘unreasonable’ and ‘without good cause’ must be read 




The argument proposed is that ‘unreasonable’ assesses a person’s conduct to see if it is 
unreasonable, and ‘without good cause’ looks at the basis on which a person has acted to see 




                                                 
 
47
 [1997] 1 Lloyds Rep 22 (QBD) 33. 
48
 [1997] 1 Lloyds Rep 22 (QBD) 33. 
49
 Cremean 80. 
50
 Cremean 80. 
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CHAPTER 3 THE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE TEST 
 Confusion in the interpretation of the test for wrongful arrest I
Professor Mandaraka-Sheppard is of the view that there is confusion as to the application of 
the test.
51
 The justification for this view is based on an interpretation of the test by Colman J 




a) ‘mala fides arrest’, where it is shown from the prima facie evidence that the 
arrestor did not have an honest belief in the reason of the arrest; or 
b) ‘obviously groundless arrest, objectively judged, from which it can be inferred 
that the arrestor did not believe in, or did not give serious regard to, its 
entitlement’. This requires that there should be an objective assessment of the 
subjective state of mind of the arresting party.
53
 
This is regarded as the equivalent of the test of without reasonable and probable cause, 
while taking into consideration the view of the court in the Kommunar to the effect that to, 
‘characterise their continued pursuit of the proceedings and maintenance of the arrest as 
without reasonable and probable cause would be putting the threshold of crassa 
negligentia far too low.’
54
 
Professor Mandaraka-Sheppard is of the view that the court meant that without an 
assessment of the subjective state of mind of the arrestor, the threshold of the test would be 
too low. This view, she argues probably originates from the  interpretation of the test in the 
Walter D Wallet, where the concept of without reasonable or probable cause was borrowed 
from the common law malicious prosecution cases and was equated to crassa negligentia.
55
 
This view is based on a literal interpretation that ‘without reasonable and probable 
cause’ in the context of the wrongful arrest of ships, ought to mean that there are no 
reasonable grounds for the arrest and/or the basis for the arrest is more likely than not to fail. 
It is submitted that this phrase, in contrast to the malicious prosecution cases, should only 
require an objective assessment of the situation without inquiring about the subjective belief 
                                                 
 
51
 Mandaraka-Sheppard vol 1 at 166. 
52
 Mandaraka-Sheppard  vol 1 at 166. 
53
 Mandaraka-Sheppard  vol 1 at 165. 
54
 Mandaraka-Sheppard  vol 1 at 165. 
55
 Mandaraka-Sheppard vol 1 at 165. 
18 
of the arrestor. The use of this phrase by the courts as the test for the wrongful arrest of ships 
gives rise to confusion as different meanings are attributed to it.
56
 
Two further factors serve to exacerbate this interpretational dilemma. These are: 
a) ‘no reasonable and probable cause’ has been regarded as the common law test derived 
from the malicious prosecution cases instead of the Admiralty law test. This test also 
requires malice which may not be inferred from a finding of ‘no reasonable or 
probable cause’. 
b) The court in The Evangelismos asked the question, ‘is the action so unwarrantably 
brought, or brought with so little foundation that it rather implies malice, or gross 
negligence which is equivalent to it?’.
 57
 
By the use of the word ‘malice’ Professor Mandaraka-Sheppard is of the view that the 
test has been conflated and this has given rise to the confusion that prevails today.
58
 
 Narrow and Broad interpretations of the test II
Nossal, in his 1996 article on damages for the wrongful arrest of a vessel,
59
 argues that there 
is no justification for the wide protection under the law provided to plaintiffs who effect a 
wrongful arrest. Further this protection is not aligned with recent developments in analogous 
areas of the law and these pitfalls in the present situation may be rectified by abandoning the 




The seemingly simple application giving rise to wrongful arrest of a vessel does not in 
itself entitle the ship owner to damages for any economic loss suffered. Damages only 
become a factor if it is proved that the arrest is made with mala fides or crassa negligentia. 
The various cases following The Evangelismos have placed undue emphasis on 
paragraph 1 of the judgement containing the concepts and failed to focus on the amplification 
in the second paragraph.
61
 
According to Nossal, the narrow test established in The Evangelismos has prevailed and 
dominates this factual scenario so much so that other legal commentators are of the view that 
no plaintiff should be apprehensive when arresting a vessel within English jurisdiction that he 
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would be then rendered vulnerable to an action for wrongful arrest.
62
 The justification for this 
attitude is that an action for wrongful arrest is rarely commenced due to the severity of the 
test established by The Evangelismos and adopted by the courts for the award of damages.
63
  
The view expressed by Cremean is that the test is not wrong, and while accepting that 
by implication the test is too narrow, also suggests as a solution that it is only a question of 
policy whether a proper test should be a little wider.
64
 
This perception adds credence to the theory that the test in The Evangelismos has 
discouraged access to courts. The test is so severe and not easily satisfied thus leaving 
potential litigants discouraged from approaching the court because the probability of being 
successful in proving the requirements of the test is so difficult that one may be said to have 
given in at the thought of the battle before setting foot on the battlefield. 
Nossal identifies five factors in answer to the question as to why, bearing in mind the 
potential financial harm to the ship owner as a result of the arrest of his vessel, that the party 
who effects the wrongful arrest is protected by law.
65
 
These inter related reasons are: 
(a) Access to courts 
To ensure that plaintiffs have a wide access to the courts, ‘[p]laintiffs should not be 
discouraged from pursing their claims by the imposition of the risk of heavy damages in the 
event that they are unable to prove adequately their allegations at trial.’ 
(b) Action in rem 
The plaintiff in an action in rem proceeds against the res itself and the ship owner or owner of 
the rest is regarded as irrelevant to the action. (If the owner of the res seeks to defend the 
action then he enters an appearance to defend, lodges security for the release of the rest and 
the action then proceeds as a hybrid both in rem and in personam despite the fact that the res 
may have already been released by the court. Should the ship owner decide not to defend, 
then the proceedings continue in rem and if the plaintiff is successful in his claim the property 
may be sold and the proceeds used to satisfy the judgement awarded. 
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(c) Malicious prosecution 
The historical position was apparently that of jurisdiction being conferred on the Admiralty 
courts by the arrest of the res. Therefore, cases dealing with the wrongful arrest of vessels are 
defined as part of the delict of malicious prosecution, characterised by the requirements of 
malice and lack of reasonable and probable cause. 
(d) Security 
Ordinarily bail or security would be provided by the defendant in exchange for the release of 
the vessel, this ensures that the law enables where the defendant suffers losses greater that the 
transaction costs incurred under the security arranged that ‘such losses ought to be considered 
too remote in that they flow more from the defendants conduct or impecuniosity that from the 
plaintiffs’ arrest’.  
(e) Costs 
This final reason is termed a fiction in that the successful litigant is fully compensated by an 
order of costs in their favour granted by the court for expenses and losses consequent upon 
the litigation. 
These five reasons are admittedly not cogent enough to sustain the ship owner’s 
argument that he should not bear the commercial losses incurred by the arrest of his vessel 
due to the honest mistake of the arrestor.
66
 
 The link to malicious prosecution III
The test for wrongful arrest of ships as provided for in The Evangelismos provides for an 
objective assessment of the subjective intention of the arresting party, objectively viewing the 
evidence supporting the erroneous arrest.
67
 The question that remains to be answered is 
whether the malice was actual or implied.
68
 
The decision in the Walter D Wallet,
69
 in introducing common law concepts into the 




This marrying of diverse concepts and contexts was alluded to by the court in the Kiku 
Pacific case,
71
 where the court commented that reference to ‘reasonable and probable cause’ 
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is a well-established common law principle in actions for malicious prosecution of persons. 
Furthermore, the facts in question were not appropriate for the test for the wrongful arrest of 
a vessel what was at issue was whether there was a right at common law to nominal damages 
for the malicious arrest of a vessel where no actual damage had been proved.
72
  
The use of the words ‘probable cause’ may be regarded as conflating that common law 
phrase drawn from the law relating to malicious prosecution with the Admiralty view of 




Generally, lawmakers are extremely careful in the use of word or terms that are 
ambiguous or have multiple meanings. Does it mean therefore that we remain stuck with an 




This simply serves as a further reason for the reform of the test for wrongful arrest so 
that clarity and a proper interpretation may be achieved. Once there is clarity, there will be 
certainty in how the law is applied and this will enhance confidence when one approaches a 
court. 
As early as 1996, it was argued that the narrow test established in The Evangelismos is 




It is not clear if malice is a necessary requirement of the rule. The court in The 
Evangelismos indicated that malice per se was not required to be proved by the defendant  in 
the original arrest proceedings, (who would in a claim for damages for wrongful arrest bear 
the onus of proving malice as plaintiff), but crass or gross negligence. 
In The Strathnaver,
76
 the test appears to have been somewhat varied to read as ‘mala 
fides or malicious negligence’. The implication of this revised version is that mere, or gross, 
negligence is not sufficient, and that malice is required to be part of the test even in relation 
to negligence. This adds impetus to the view that the action for damages for the wrongful 
arrest of a vessel and the delict of malicious prosecution, where the plaintiff is required to 
prove that the defendant instituted or maintained the proceedings maliciously, are the same.  
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  The same court - (Barnett J)- in The Cathcart,
77
 The Margaret Jane,
78
 and The Walter 
D Wallet,
79
 found the plaintiffs liable for damages for wrongful arrest but only in The 
Margaret Jane was malice not proved. 
In three other cases damages were awarded for wrongful arrest where no malice was 




 and The Cheshire Witch.
82
 
‘If malice is indeed a necessary requirement of the rule then it will be only in exceedingly 
rare cases that the defendant will succeed in his claim for damages for wrongful arrest. 
Malice may be proved by evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff arrested the 




It is evident from the decisions above that there is inconsistency is awarding damages 
whether malice is present or not. 
As Professor Jackson indicates for damages to be awarded there must be some element 
in the arrester’s conduct apart from enforcement of his claim, that will give rise to the 
satisfaction of the element of malice. 
In The Ohm Maria ex Peony,
84
 the court concluded that the true basis of the claim is to 
use the common law phrase without reasonable or probable cause and use the Admiralty 
language of crassa negligentia; or mala fides.
85
 
The rule as phrased above creates a test that is far more easily satisfied. But this test 
does however detract from the principles of The Evangelismos and The Strathnaver and 




This is the basis for the contention that the test for determining whether damages for 
wrongful arrest ought to be awarded is uncertain. Should the applicable test be the narrow 
rule established in The Evangelismos then the ceiling remains far too high as established by 
the courts, and appears to be overwhelming.
87
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Should a plaintiff ship owner use the argument of having obtained legal advice as 
happened in the case of Glinski v McIver,
88
 where the House of Lords in handing down 
judgement on malicious prosecution commented that where an arrest is wrongful the arresting 
party who obtained and acted upon legal advice prior to the arrest may be protected in a 
subsequent action for malicious prosecution as it may not be said that he acted without 
reasonable or probable cause. This opinion is refuted in the context of the shipping industry 
as the likelihood of a ship owner commencing arrest or in rem proceedings without obtaining 
prior legal advice is exceptional.
89
 
The position in United Kingdom law following the implementation of the Judicature 
Acts 1873-1875 changed Admiralty Practice by the introduction of the writ of summons. 
Proceedings have since then been commenced by the issue of an Admiralty writ in rem and 
the service of that writ or acknowledgement thereof by the defendant serves to establish the 
jurisdiction of the Court. While the right to arrest the res may be perceived as a 
complementary action to the action in rem, the functions of the writ and the warrant of arrest 
are distinct and the two procedures are not required to prosecute an action in rem.
90
 
Proceedings in rem may continue and even default judgement taken under an action in 
rem without the arrest of the res that is the subject of the action. The arrest of a vessel is not 
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CHAPTER 4 APPROACH BY CIVIL AND COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS 
 Introduction I
 Approach in common law jurisdictions II
(a) Canada 
Amongst the objections to reforming the rule in The Evangelismos is that the practice in 
Canada would not be consistent with other maritime states which retain the rule; and further 
that modifying the threshold for wrongful arrest actions would not undermine Canada’s 
position among maritime nations, but may instead serve to encourage plaintiffs to act more 




According to Michell arrest of a ship or cargo is a powerful weapon in a plaintiffs’ 
armoury, and may be invoked with little regard for the damage that may result. The view 
advanced is that the rule as provided for in The Evangelismos has a threshold that is too high, 
and the middle ground of a standard of unreasonableness while preferable would bind the 
courts to a costly and lengthy enquiry into the plaintiff’s motives for initiating the arrest.
93
 
‘The undertaking in damages requirement and the imposition of liability upon plaintiffs 
who are unsuccessful at trial regardless of their motives or the reasonableness of their 
actions, represent a clearer rule and would achieve a more appropriate balance between 
the interests of plaintiffs and defendants in maritime cases.’
94
 
The decision by the Canadian Court of Appeal in the matter of Armada Lines td v 
Chaleur Fertilizers Ltd
95
, in respect of the wrongful arrest of cargo and security lodged as a 
condition of release, were set aside, and amounted to a finding by implication that the arrest 
was unlawful and the security unnecessary. The court held that the shipper was entitled to 
damages for wrongful arrest of its cargo. The court expressly acknowledged the Federal 
Court Rule 1003 which provides for arrest of vessels as not specifically requiring an 
undertaking as to damages for wrongful arrest, and it was therefore a necessary inference that 
a plaintiff assumes the consequences of an arrest should the arrest be wrongful.  
One of the requirements of a Mareva injunction as set out by Lord Denning MR in 
Third Chandris Shipping Corp v Unimarine SA,
96
 whereby a plaintiff must give an 
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undertaking in damages in the event that the plaintiff fails in its action or the injunction turns 
out to be unjustified, was also suggested as a possible approach.
97
 
On appeal, however, this approach was rejected and the rule in The Evangelismos 
expressly confirmed. The court cited the following expression with approval, ‘the gravamen 
of the right to recover damages for wrongful seizure or detention of a vessel is the bad faith, 
malice or gross negligence of the offending party.’
98
 
The Supreme Court of Canada while presented with an opportunity to reconsider the 
rule in The Evangelismos, declined to avail itself of the opportunity. The court’s justification 
for refusing to do so was that of all the common law jurisdictions only Australia had actually 
departed from the rule and did so by way of statutory enactment and that any modification to 
the rule in The Evangelismos should be done by the legislature not the courts.
99
 
This decision has been criticised as a failure by the courts to modify or remove the test 
in The Evangelismos which rule was a part of its colonial inheritance, and is not reflected in 
the Supreme Court of Canada, which is regarded as rarely being reluctant to overrule private 
law precedent for reasons of principle.
100
 This is evidenced by two decisions
101
 of the 
Canadian Supreme Court released a few months after the decision in Armada Lines v Chaleur 
Fertilisers where the Supreme Court modified common law rules and established the 
principles in order to determine whether it would be appropriate to do so.
102
 
Michells’ argument is that since in the above decisions the Supreme Court held that: 
‘Courts may change common law rules where this is necessary to achieve justice and 
fairness by bringing the law into harmony with social moral and economic changes in 
society and where the change will not have complex and unforeseeable consequences”,
103
 
that similarly as the rule in The Evangelismos is in conflict with the modern day 
principles of justice and fairness that by breaking away from the rule  would not give rise 
to complex and unforeseeable repercussion but would by modifying the rules align the 
law of maritime arrest with civil remedies in general and on a principled basis.’
104
 
                                                 
 
97
 Margolis 12. 
98
 Margolis 12. 
99
 Michell 480. 
100
 Michell 482. 
101
 Porto Seguro Companhia De Seguros Gerais v Belcan SA [1997] 2 SCR 1278 and Bow Valley Huskey 
(Bermuda Ltd) v Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd [1997] 3 SCR 1210. 
102
 Michell 482. 
103
 [1997] SCR 1278 1292. 
104
 Michell 482. 
26 
This begs the question therefore as to why the Supreme Court saw fit to amend other 
rules but declined to do in respect of wrongful arrest. 
(b) New Zealand- Wrongful arrest of aircraft under admiralty jurisdiction 
In the unreported judgement of Transpac Express Ltd v Malaysian Airlines
105
  involving the 
application of admiralty jurisdiction to arrest a Boeing 737 in respect of a carriage of goods 
dispute.
106
 The Auckland High Court issued a warrant of arrest and the aircraft was arrested 
and detained for two days before being released. The plaintiff thereafter admitted that there 
had been no jurisdiction to arrest the aircraft under the Admiralty Act. The defendant 
counterclaimed for abuse of process and wrongful arrest. The court confirmed that the rule as 
established in The Evangelismos is part of New Zealand law, and in applying the rule to the 
facts of the matter, the court found that the plaintiff’s incorrect view that there was 
jurisdiction under the Admiralty Act to arrest the aircraft was merely an error of judgement 
with no bad faith or gross negligence discernible.
107
 
The plaintiff was consequently found to have acted in bad faith or was grossly 
negligent in bringing admiralty proceedings on what it either knew, or should have known, 




A number of pertinent questions are raised:
109
 
(i) Why should a plaintiff not incur liability for immobilising a commercially valuable asset 
when it was, or should have been, evident that there was no admiralty jurisdiction on the 
plain wording of the act? 
(ii) Where an error of judgment is discovered, or should reasonably have been discovered, 
after arrest why should a plaintiff not be under a positive duty to ensure that the arrested 
property is released immediately? 
(iii) Surely it adds insult to injury to require the defendant to argue for the release of its 
wrongfully detained vessel? 
These are all valid questions, and have as a linking thread the notion of reasonableness. 
Particularly with regard to the latter two questions, in relation to the test in The 
Evangelismos, the arresting party should be under a duty to ensure that the arrested vessel is 
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released immediately should the arrest have been effected consequent to an error of 
judgement. Allowing an arrest to continue despite knowing that it has been effected without 
justification or valid reason, is perpetuating a wrong already committed by another wrong.  
Reasonableness would require, as would any sense of equity, that a defendant whose 
vessel has been arrested should not have to argue for the release of his own vessel where the 
arrestor stands by and listens to these arguments and opposes them knowing full well that he 
had no valid reason for the arrest of the vessel to begin with and yet allows the defendant to 
argue for the release of the vessel. 
In a later New Zealand judgement before the High Court in the matter of Mobil Oil 
New Zealand v The Ship Rangiora,
110
 involving an application by the owners of three 
arrested vessels to set aside the arrest on the basis of the courts in rem jurisdiction having not 
been properly invoked, the court held that damages for wrongful arrest may only be 
recovered where the arrest has been procured with malice. The court commented as follows: 
‘The situation for an owner is not so bleak in Australia where, as noted, the federal admiralty 
legislation imposes a liability for damages for unreasonable arrest on parties procuring the arrest of 
a ship. The test of unreasonableness is a much lesser burden that the test of malice. In my view a 
case can be made out for a legislative rebalancing of odds which disproportionately favour 
plaintiffs in this jurisdiction. In making these observations I acknowledge that our jurisdiction is 
modelled on the English system which has an ancient heritage. Arrest has always been a very 
powerful remedy recognised in most jurisdictions- malice is the measurement of English law in 
wrongful arrest actions. The need for international consistency is…... deserving of consideration. 




(c) South Africa 
The potential for substantial commercial loss as a result of the arrest or attachment of a ship, 
or even of its bunkers, cargo or equipment, may lead to delays in its schedule, and lead to 
further problems. The issue of wrongful arrest in South African law is governed by statute. 
South Africa is not a signatory to either the 1952 or the 1999 Arrest Conventions. The statute 
governing admiralty matters in South Africa is the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 
1983, (AJRA).  
Section 5(4) of AJRA addresses the issues of wrongful arrest and demands for 
excessive security by providing that any person who makes an excessive claim or requires 
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excessive security or without reasonable and probable cause obtains the arrest of property or 
an order of court shall be liable to any person suffering loss or damage as a result thereof for 
that loss or damage. The test as provided for in the 1992 Amendment to AJRA is the same as 
the common law test for damages for the wrongful arrest of persons. 
Where a party invokes the Act and obtains an order of court for the arrest or attachment 
of a ship, that party is regarded as having impliedly submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. 
This then enables the court to have jurisdiction to hear a counterclaim for damages against 
the arrestor under s 5(4) of the Act.  
According to Hofmeyr,
112
 if a party described in the summons as the owner or insurer 
of a ship or cargo, or if notice of intention to defend is given in an action in rem, the power of 
attorney may describe the parties as they are described in the action, and together with the 
power of attorney filed, an undertaking must also be filed by the attorney to pay any costs 
awarded against the party represented by him and any damages awarded against that party in 
terms of s 5(4) of the Act. The undertaking provided is enforceable by the other parties to the 
action. 
In Mediterranean Shipping Co v Speedwell Co,
113
 it was held that the words loss or 
damage are no different from and are to be equated with delictual damages and like delictual 
damages are subject only to considerations of causation and remoteness.
114
 The expenses that 
were incurred in obtaining security in order to obtain the release of maritime property from 
arrest or attachment are recoverable as damages flowing form the wrongful detention of the 
property. However, attorney and client costs incurred in setting aside an arrest or attachment 
order in a proceeding to recover damages for the wrongful detention of property are not 
recoverable as damages. 
The South African courts have judicially considered the expression “reasonable and 
probable cause” in relation to the delict of malicious prosecution. The courts have held that 
the meaning reasonable and probable cause as referred to in S5 (4) was intended to have the 
same meaning as the meaning recognised in the context of malicious prosecution.
115
 
An action for damages can potentially arise where the person obtaining the order did 
not have information which would lead a reasonable person to conclude that it was probable 
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that he was entitled to the order sought. The arrestor must have had the honest belief that the 
information in his possession made it probable that he was entitled to the order sought. 
Should the arrestor raise the defence of a reasonable and probable cause this could be 
repudiated by the lack of this honest belief. 
116
 
The existence of a reasonable and probable cause may also be extinguished if the 
arrestor acting on legal advice did not honestly believe that the advice was probably correct. 
Where an arrest may be set aside for whatever reason, does not automatically mean that 
the arrest was obtained without probable cause. The provisions of S5 (4) are not geared to 
penalise an unsuccessful litigant, but rather to penalise a litigant who acted unreasonably and 
thus obtained an order.
117
 
S1(1) of the AJRA allows as a maritime claim: “wrongful or malicious 
proceedings…or the wrongful or malicious arrest, attachment or detention…. wherever such 
proceedings, arrest, attachment or detention took place.” 
This paragraph should be read with S 5 (4) and includes damages for an arrest or any 
order of court obtained without reasonable or probable cause or resulting from an excessive 
claim or demand for excessive security. 
Sir Eder refers to the South African approach as cited in the Law and Practise of 
Admiralty Matters
118
, as together with Australia, being notable exceptions. The legislation in 
these jurisdictions refer to a party who obtains an arrest “without reasonable or probable 
cause” in South Africa or acts “unreasonably and without good cause” in Australia as 
potentially liable in damages.  
Sir Eder maintains the view that these tests are broadly similar to that applied in The 
Walter D Wallet,
119
 and poses the question that if so, whether the law in South Africa or 
Australia differs materially from English Law.
120
 
Section 5(4) reads:  
‘Any person who makes an excessive claim or requires excessive security or without 
reasonable or probable cause obtains the arrest of property or an order of court shall be 
liable to any person suffering loss or damage as a result thereof for that loss or damage.’ 
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Originally the test for wrongful arrest in section 5(4) was that it should be effected 
‘without good cause’. In 1992, the Act was amended to provide for the test of ‘reasonable and 
probable cause’. In the application of this test the courts have been clear in that the 
application must make full disclosure of all the elements of the claim. 
In the Snow Crystal,
121
 the Supreme Court of Appeal, in acknowledging the 
consequences of the failure of a ship to maintain its schedule of delivery and taking on of 
cargo and the commercial loss associated thereto held that the loss of future charter hire was 
allowed as foreseeable damages consequent upon the delay of the ship in breach of a dry 
docking contract.  
The court in its judgement referred with approval to the dictum of Didcott J, made in 
the context of attachments though equally relevant in the context of wrongful arrest, in the 
matter of Katagum Wholesale Commodities Co Ltd v The MV Paz:
122
 
‘to stop or delay [a ship’s] departure from one of our ports, to interrupt its voyage for 
longer that the period it was due to remain, can have and usually has consequences which 
are damaging to its owner and charterer, not to mention those who are relying upon its 
arrival at other ports to load or discharge cargo.’
123
 
In The Cape Athos,
124
 the arresting party and both local and foreign attorneys were held 
jointly and severally liable to the complainant owner of the arrested vessel. In affirming that 
the lack of honest belief negatives the defence of reasonable and probable cause the court was 
of the view that where the defence to a claim under s 5(4) is that the party concerned relied 
on reasonable grounds that the arrest was justified and where such defence is based on legal 
advice received, the question as to whether a reasonable client would have accepted the 
advice and would have acted upon it, is a question of fact. The question in issue was whether 
the defendants in causing the arrest of The Cape Athos did so without reasonable and 
probable cause. 
The court in its application of the s 5(4) of AJRA and the expression ‘without 
reasonable or probable cause’ held that the expression should bear a similar meaning to that 
attributed to it in the context of malicious prosecution which is that a lack of honest belief 
negatives a defence of reasonable and probable cause. Where the defence to a claim under s 
5(4) is that the party believed on reasonable grounds that the arrest was justified and such 
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defence is based upon legal advice received the question whether in a given case a reasonable 
person would have accepted that advice and proceeded accordingly is a question of fact. In 
addition, the value to be attached to the legal advisers’ advice would depend upon whether 
the client had placed all the relevant facts before the legal advice and the circumstances under 
which the advice was given. The test is whether a reasonable person would have believed that 
the advice was probably correct. 
The court referred to a number of English authorities in its judgement, as well as the 
South Africa Supreme Court of Appeal judgment in the MV Heavy Metal,
125
 and concurred 
that ‘without reasonable and probable cause’ had the same meaning in Admiralty as it did in 
malicious prosecution, and further that this was the intention of the legislature.  
The argument of the defendant was that in terms of the legal advice they had received 
that the non-arrest clause had no binding effect on them and was not able to be enforced by 
the other parties to the agreement. The court held that the defendants could not reasonably 
have believed that the provision was no longer of force and effect.
126
  
The court noted that it appeared from the evidence that the defendants had decided that 
they wanted to seize the opportunity to arrest the vessel and left it to their lawyers to arrive at 
a plausible argument to justify the arrest. 
The court in arriving at its conclusion referred with approval to various international 
law decisions. The court referred to the Appeal Court judgement of Schreiner J in 
Beckenstrater v Rottcher and Theunissen,
127
 where the court referred to the United Kingdom 
judgment of Leibo v D Buckman,
128
 where the court held that the definition of reasonable and 
probable cause should be defined as an honest belief in the guilt of the accused based on a 
full conviction founded upon reasonable grounds of the existence of a set of circumstances 
which if believed to be true would reasonably lead any ordinary prudent man to conclude that 
the person charged was guilty of the crime accused of. The court also referred to Glinski v 
McIver,
129
 where the court held that just as a prosecutor is justified in acting on information 
given to him by witnesses one may also accept advice on the law provided by a competent 
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lawyer. This would be the course of action of a reasonable man and if so the objective test 
would be satisfied. 
In the matter of the MV Snow Petrel,
130
 involving an application for security in terms of 
S 5(2) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act and security for costs in terms of Rule 47 
of the Uniform Rules of Court, the second applicant was the owner of the first applicant until 
recently, and in instituting the action the respondent caused the first applicant to be arrested.  
The first applicant was released from arrest following on receipt of a bank guarantee. 
The second applicant instituted a counter claim against the respondent for damages arising 
from an alleged repudiation of a charter party agreement concluded between itself and the 
respondent, and claims loss of profits which it would have earned from use of the vessel 
between the date of the end of the charter and the date of release of the vessel from arrest 
being an amount of over R2m. Damages were also claimed by the second applicant pursuant 
to the wrongful arrest of the vessel based on crew and agents fees. 
The court held that in respect of the claim for both losses of profit and damages 
following the arrest of the vessel the second applicant must establish that the arrest of the 
vessel was without reasonable and probable cause and accordingly wrongful in terms of s 
5(4) of the AJRA. 
In referring to the decision in the MV Heavy Metal,
131
 the court made reference to the 
interpretation of the phrase ‘reasonable and probable cause’ meaning an honest belief 
founded on reasonable grounds.
132
 Unfortunately in this matter the second applicant failed to 
allege facts which would establish that the plaintiff did not have an honest belief that the 
arrest of the vessel was a necessary step in the prosecution of its claim against the applicants. 
The court in considering the phrase ‘without reasonable and probable cause’ in s 5(4) 
commented on the existing use of the phrase in the malicious prosecution context, and that it 
was the intention of Parliament as the national law making body that the phrase had the same 
meaning. The court was of the view that a person acting with honest belief at the time 
founded on reasonable grounds does not act without reasonable or probable cause; ‘by 
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invoking such a well-known phrase, the intention was to import both the subjective and 
objective elements referred to earlier. However, malice is not a requirement.’
133
 
Woodford notes the criticism of the Australian Law Reform Commission in respect of 
the South African Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act, to the effect that the language in s 
5(4) of the AJRA is vague.
134
 The provision was later amended in 1992. 
Section 5(4) of the AJRA forms the basis for S 34 of the Australian Admiralty Act 
1988. 
Section 34 provides that in relation to a proceeding commenced under the Act that a 
party who unreasonably and without good cause obtains the arrest of a ship or other property 
under the Act is then liable in damages to a party to the proceedings or to a person who has 
an interest in the ship or the property being a party or person who has suffered loss or damage 
as a direct result. The wording of this test - ‘unreasonably and without good cause’ - in the 
Australian Admiralty Act and s 5(4), in the South African AJRA – it must be noted that 
neither Act makes mention of gross or crassa negligentia. 
A person acting in bad faith or with gross negligence may well be acting unreasonably 
and without good cause but if one acts unreasonably and without good cause does this mean 
one is being grossly negligent or there is crassa negligentia.  
Clearly ‘acting unreasonably and without good cause’ is a wider notion and there is no 
link to malice or implying malice in these terms. Can malice or gross negligence be regarded 
as included in ‘acting unreasonably and without good cause’? 
The test is phrased conjunctively by the use of the word ‘and ‘and therefore both parts 
of the test must be satisfied. 
Secondly only a person who has suffered loss and damage is within the scope of the 
provision and only if such loss or damage is suffered as a direct result of the wrongful arrest. 
This therefore ensures that only those directly affected by the conduct are able to claim. 
(d) United Kingdom 
(i) Gulf Azov v Idisi135 
The owners of the cargo detained the ship and her crew in Nigeria. An exorbitant 
amount of USD 17 million was demanded as security for the release of the ship. The P & I 
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club offered security by way of a letter of undertaking for USD 1,5 million but it was 
rejected. Following further negotiations an amount of USD 3million was eventually accepted 
as security. The owners and the P & I club then obtained a freezing order on the USD 3m and 
alleged that the agreement to pay the amount was voidable due to the duress and further that 
the vessel was wrongfully arrested. Judgement was obtained in default and the defendants 
applied to set the judgement aside.  
The court decided in favour of the owners and this decision was further affirmed by the 
Appeal Court. The court held regarding the issue of the wrongful arrest that there was no 
objective justification for the amount claimed and the issue then arose as to whether the 
arrestor believed that there was such justification. The evidence showed that in the absence of 
any serious considerations, as to whether there was a sufficient basis for the arrest in respect 
of which such an excessive amount of security was demanded, led to the conclusion that 
wrongful arrest was clearly established. 
(ii) The Kallang (No 2)136 
In this instance although The Evangelismos test was not applied, had it been applied the 
outcome would have been the same. The facts in this matter entails Axa Senegal, the cargo 
receiver and insurer who in awareness of the fact that any disputes between the owners and 
receivers would be subject to arbitration in London, arrested the vessel in Dakar for the dual 
purpose of obtaining security and for establishing jurisdiction. Security offered by the owners 
P & I club was also rejected. Axa demanded a bank guarantee enforceable in the Senegalese 
jurisdiction, with the underlying agenda of using the arrest to force the owners to abandon the 
London arbitration clause which would be amount to a breach of the contract between the 
owners and the receivers and render them liable for damages on the basis of procuring breach 
of contract. The damages awarded were based on the ten days’ wrongful arrest during which 
time the owners suffered losses for the use of the vessel, loss of hire for the next scheduled 
charter, and usage of gas oil and port charges, amounting in total to USD 130,350.00. 




The first step involves a consideration of whether the arresting party honestly believed 
that it was entitled to arrest the vessel. Should it be established that the arresting party did not 
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have such an honest belief there is then no need to enquire further and that party will then be 
held liable for damages for wrongful arrest of the vessel on that basis.  
Secondly, where the lack of an objective basis for the arrest gives rise to the inference 
that the arresting party held no actual belief in his entitlement to arrest or pursued the arrest 
regardless of whether grounds existed for a valid arrest, then this conduct will give rise to the 
conclusion of male fides, rendering the arrest wrongful and the arrestor liable in damages. 
The test is considered to be an extremely onerous one,
138
 and the high threshold 
established has proved to be effective in apparently discouraging ship owners from engaging 
in claims for damages for wrongful arrest.
139
 According to Steven Chong, this is a fact best 





 The 1896 decision of The Schooner Village
141
 marked the beginning of the period 
of no reported decisions on damages for wrongful arrest in English courts until the 1971 
Court of Appeal decision in The Damianos.
142
 
The nature of the test for wrongful arrest is widely regarded in this modern age as being 
out of step with the current times. The explanation as to why such a high threshold exists in 
respect of this issue is since at the time when the test developed the arrest of a ship 
constituted the commencement of an in rem action. The existing perception at the time was 
that at the initiation of the proceeding the plaintiff might not be able to prove its claim on a 
balance of probabilities.
143
 The position therefore would be that it should not be held liable 
for an action wrongfully commenced unless it could be proven that the action was malicious 
or initiated without reasonable or probable cause.
144
 
The analogy between claiming damages for wrongful arrest and the delictual action for 
malicious prosecution where either malice or an absence of reasonable or probable cause 
must be evident. Chong argues that were this still position there might be an important policy 
rationale to maintain the high threshold in The Evangelismos ‘since allowing recovery for 
wrongful arrest too easily might have the unintended effect of stifling what would otherwise 
be legitimate in rem claims’.
145
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The introduction of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 in the UK enabled the 
commencement of admiralty actions by way of the issuing of a writ without the 
accompanying arrest of the vessel. Therefore, the historical justification for the stringent test 
established in The Evangelismos has no basis. 
146
 
Chong views the test as being one sided and excessively plaintiff friendly. He refers 
with approval to the Singapore decision of the Vasiliy Golovnin that ‘the law ought not to 
perpetuate the now false analogy between malicious prosecution and damages for wrongful 
arrest’.
147
 The perpetuation of this test and its high threshold will simply serve to cause 
immense financial loss to ship owners, and even where an arrest will prove to be ill founded , 
the costs awarded as compensation may be prove to be insufficient in comparison to the 




Australia has, after South Africa, promulgated legislative provisions to provide for damages 
for wrongful arrest. This is provided for in s 34 of the Admiralty Act of 1988 of Australia 
which provides that where a party unreasonably and without good cause demands excessive 
security in relation to the proceeding or, obtains the arrest of a ship or other property under 
this Act; then the person is liable in damages to a party to the proceeding or to a person who 
has suffered loss or damage as a direct result. 
The above statutory provision is considered as necessary otherwise wrongful arrest is 
very difficult to prove and practical experience has made clear that the vexation or plaintiff 
will not often be concerned with the potential liability of paying damages.
149
 
As at October 2015 there was no decided case in Australia where a ship owner 
successfully sought damages for wrongful arrest. 
The Australian Admiralty Act 1988, provides that a plaintiff in Australia may recover 
damages for wrongful arrest if it can be proved that the arrest was initiated unreasonably and 
without good cause. The test established in the Australian statute is considered as being 
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(f) Singapore 
In the jurisdictions of both Singapore and Hong Kong, recent decisions have given rise to the 
view that The Evangelismos test is too harsh. 
The decision of The Rainbow Spring
151
 has been considered as the commencement of a 
pro-ship owner trend in the formulation of arrest decisions in Singapore courts.
152
 In the 
Rainbow Spring the arrest was set aside for two reasons: firstly due to the claimants inability 
to demonstrate that the ship-owner was liable in respect of the claim and secondly due to the 
claimants failure to render full disclosure of all material facts in support of its claim. 
In the case of The Vasily Golovnin,
153
 before the Singapore High Court, the court 
criticised the test established in The Evangelismos and commented that the high threshold to 
be met in satisfying the test undoubtedly acted as a deterrent to ship owners in lodging claims 
for wrongful arrest.  The relevance of the test in the light of its establishment over a century 
ago could not continue to retain its pertinence bearing in mind that potential litigants could 




The court stated: ‘it is always open to this court to depart from this judicially created 
test when the day comes when it no longer serves any relevant purpose.’
155
 
The court then back-tracked and decided that it would leave the issue to be addressed 
more fully at a more appropriate juncture after receiving full arguments from counsel and 
submissions from the maritime industry.
156
  
The test was nevertheless satisfied on the facts and the vessel was held to be wrongfully 
arrested. As was the case in Armada Lines v Chaleur Fertilisers, though for different reasons, 
the court while acknowledging that the test could no longer be relevant, declined to review or 
discard it, thus leaving the test for wrongful arrest as established in The Evangelismos, 
applicable and in place for future similar situations. 
The appeal of a lower threshold to be adopted in place of the continued use of the test 
as set down in The Evangelismos was evident in the Singapore judgement of The Vasiliy 
Golovnin. The Court of Appeal set aside the second arrest in Singapore by the bank of the 
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sister ship of the carrying ship which had been arrested at Lomé, Togo, and released on the 
grounds that there was no arguable case shown by the bank for the non-delivery of the cargo 
discharged at Lomé and further that the bank had failed to disclose material facts of an inter 
partes hearing at Lomé ventilating these same issues which were at the hearing resolved in 
favour of the owners. 
The court was of the view that it was necessary for a party seeking to rely on the arrest 
of a vessel as security for a potential arbitration award to disclose in its affidavit brought 
under an ex parte application for a warrant of arrest, all the material facts. It transpired that 
had these facts been disclosed it would have made the court aware that the owner had 
delivered the cargo at the correct port. 
When the owner of the ship brought a cross appeal for the wrongful arrest of the vessel 
the court held that the arrest was wrongful. This decision was based on the test of crassa 
negligentia, which was satisfied; the court holding that the bank could not in all honesty have 
believed in the validity of its claim.  
In its obiter discussion of The Evangelismos test the court questioned the continued 
validity of the test and its relevance in modern times. 
‘with the historical background in mind and in the light of the legislative reforms 
undertaken by some other Commonwealth countries, it may be rightly asked if The 
Evangelismos test which appears conceptually anachronistic, should continue to be the 




The comments of the court are indicative of the receptiveness of the court towards no 
longer accepting without question a test that is outdated and of the opening up of the court to 
a consideration that perhaps the test cannot be said to be applicable in modern times, but 
more so a recognition that the test is no longer functional or efficacious and is actually 
leading to unjust and inequitable situations. 
 ‘The arrest of a vessel is never a trifling matter. Arrest is a very powerful invasive 
remedy. An arrest of a ship can lead to tremendous inconvenience, financial distress and 
severe commercial embarrassment. Even the briefest of delays can cause significant 
losses. It can also in certain instances prejudice the livelihood of the ship’s crew and the 
commercial fortunes of the ship owner. Maritime arrests can, when improperly executed, 
sometimes be as destructive as Anton Piller orders and even as potentially ruinous as 
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Mareva injunctions, the two nuclear weapons of civil litigation. As such, a plaintiff must 
always remain cautious and rigorously ascertain the material facts before applying for a 
warrant of arrest. While there is no need to establish a conclusive case at the outset there 
is certainly a need to establish a good arguable case before an arrest warrant can be 




Despite their losses in Togo the Swiss banks decided to arrest a sister ship in Singapore 
a few weeks later. Their claim was struck out and held to be without merit and unarguable. 
The arrest was set aside and found to be wrongful, the court holding that the plaintiffs 
acted maliciously and were liable to pay damages to the owners for the detention of the 
vessel. The court was of the view that not only disclosure that was deliberate or calculated to 
mislead would lead to damages but also where there was a failure to disclose material facts 
due to gross negligence or recklessness.
159
 
The impact of this decision for wrongful ship arrests is that the Court affirmed the high 
threshold test for assessing claims for wrongful arrest by holding that the ship owner would 
need to show malice or gross negligence. It appears that the Singapore Appeal Court 
exhibited a propensity toward lessening the standard on the facts in holding the plaintiffs 
liable to the owners for damages for wrongful arrest. The focus would henceforth be on the 
court making an objective inquiry in to the circumstances prevailing as at the time of the 
arrest so as to assess whether action and the arrest were unwarrantedly brought or brought 




The decision in the STX Mumbai,
161
 by the Singapore Court of Appeal, which reversed 
the decision of the Singapore High Court, which latter court had awarded damages for 
wrongful arrest to the ship owner and set aside the arrest. On appeal the court was asked to 
confirm that the arrest was wrongful. This could have been an opportunity to restate or revise 
the Singapore judiciary’s approach to the test for wrongful arrest. The arresting party, a 
bunker supplier argued that the impending insolvency of the owner of the STX Mumbai, the 
STX Pan Ocean would result in an anticipatory breach of the defendant’s obligations and thus 
claimed it was justified in pursuing the arrest. Payment for the bunkers was however not due 
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until a later specified date. The court held that the vessel could not be arrested until such time 
as the defendant defaulted on the payment as per the contract. The court endorsed the test as 
established in The Evangelismos as upheld by the Singapore Court of Appeal in The Kiku 
Pacific,
162
 and The Vasiliy Golovnin, and determined that both mala fides and crassa 
negligentia were present. An exacerbating fact in this regard is the fact that even after being 
informed by the defendants that there was no legal basis for the arrest the Plaintiffs 
maintained the arrest of the vessel, and delayed in providing information on the security 
required for the release of the vessel. 
The status of the city state of Singapore as the world’s busiest bunkering port and an 
arena where ship arrests while prevalent remain subject to  a progressive judiciary seeking to 
craft a balance between providing the remedy of arrest to compliant claimants and the 
economic need to protect ship owners from unsupported claims involves the assessment of 
these rival interests by imposing on arresting parties a duty of disclosure of all material facts 
failing which the arrest may be set aside  but not penalising the same arresting party with 




In this matter the mala fides of the arresting party was evident, and hence the court 
upheld the test for wrongful arrest. It is essential therefore that where a party seeks to effect 
an arrest that this far reaching step be taken with care and cognisance of the rights of the 
vessel owner or charterer. 
There is no minimum claim in order to exercise the right to arrest a vessel. Hence a 
claimant with a claim of R50,000.00 may arrest a vessel of R50m. Such an act may serve to 
hamstring the operations of that vessel and its parent line. 
At the same time a claimant with a modest claim may decide not to proceed by way of 
arrest of a vessel, regardless of the justification for his claim, if he anticipates that he will be 
faced with a counterclaim for damages. 
A recent decision emanating from the High Court of Singapore in December 2015 
serves to provide further evidence of the entrenched nature of the test for wrongful arrest that 
the arrestor will be liable for damages caused to the ship owner or charterer if the arrestor has 
acted with gross negligence.
164
 In the decision of Big Port Service v Owners of ‘Xin Chang 
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Shu’, the High Court of Singapore held that claimants were liable for damages for the 
wrongful arrest of the vessel. 
It transpired that the owners had ordered bunkers and after payment for the supply 
thereof the ship was arrested by Big Port Service which claimed to have supplied such 
bunkers to the ship following a request by OW Bunkers Singapore who alleged that they 
were agents of the owners. However, it transpired that the arrestor was aware that the 
company was not the agent of the owners but a company who had supplied the bunkers 
purchased from claimants to the actual agents and had been paid for the supply. The court 
applied the test for wrongful arrest as established in The Evangelismos and cited with 
approval and applied in The Vasiliy Golovnin. 
(g) Hong Kong 
The Hong Kong High court, in The Avon, was of the view that the test of malice was harsh 
and a lesser standard would be more appropriate for wrongful arrest. However, the courts did 
not implement this view in applying a lower threshold test consistently so as to give rise to a 
more robust movement in moving away from the test as set down in The Evangelismos. 
In the case of the MV Jimrise,
165
 the court confirmed the approach of the Hong Kong 
High Court to awarding damages for wrongful arrest, which is that damages are only granted 
in circumstances where there is evidence of malicious negligence on behalf of an arresting 
party. The court displayed its reluctance to issue an order inquiring into damages for 
wrongful arrest. The test for showing that an arresting party has acted in bad faith or with 
malicious negligence sets a high threshold and is generally regarded as difficult for an 
arrested party to satisfy. While espousing a view that the test is too harsh and that something 
less should be required, this view has not been translated into reforming the test itself. 
(h) Approach in Civil Law Jurisdictions 
The Dutch law approach of a strict liability rule in the case of wrongful arrest in similar 
to German law, it terms of which if the underlying claim in respect of which the arrest was 
made is unsuccessful on the merits, the arresting party may be liable in delict for wrongful 
arrest, irrespective of good faith or absence of fault on his part. 
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Bearing in mind the nature of an ex parte application being brought without notice, and 
if it appears that the application also failed to include all material facts and therefore mislead 
the court, this can prove to be the end to the ship arrest.
166
  
Steele makes it clear that there is no specific set Civil law approach to liability for 
wrongful arrest. Every country respectively approaches the issue of wrongful arrest 
differently through the prism of the fundamental values and liberties of significance to it. In 
France the right to arrest is considered part of civic rights to seek recourse to justice, whereas 




Following the advent of the 1952 Arrest Convention, the issue of liability for wrongful 
arrest is governed by the law of the place where the arrest occurred and by implication 
necessitates a familiarity with the law of that place to determine whether the wrongful arrest 
of a vessel may give rise to the payment of damages. 
The civil law countries in Europe are divided about the basic question as to whether if 
the claim in respect of which the arrest was made is unsuccessful on the merits is it then 
sufficient to found liability for wrongful arrest.     
The Netherlands, Germany, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland are in 
agreement with this question and hold the applicant for arrest strictly liable if its claim fails 
on the merits, irrespective of fault or good faith.  
Belgium France Italy and Greece follow an approach similar to English law and require 
that various degrees of fault viz. abuse of rights, gross negligence or bad faith must be proved 
by the applicant for arrest before liability for wrongful arrest may arise. 
(i) The way forward 
It is established that the claim in respect of which the arrest has arisen does not have to be 
rejected by the court in order to result in the liability of the arrestor. The conduct of the 
arrestor must have been grossly negligent. This is the prevailing practice in Belgium, 
England, France, Greece, Haiti, Italy, Nigeria, and Spain. In Holland, Norway, and Germany 
the arrestor is liable in damages if the claim is rejected, irrespective of fault, whereas in 
Denmark the arrestor is rendered liable for damages if the claim is unjustified- either by 
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being rejected or the ship is released and it is proved that the claims made could not stand at 
trial.  
In other jurisdictions, even if the claim is rejected on its merits, the arrest is not justified 
where due to the financial conditions of the debtor the claimant had no need for security. 
The common and civil law divide looms ominously in any endeavour to achieve 
uniformity. This difference in approach between the two jurisdictions does not appear to me 
to be an insurmountable chasm. There can be a meeting of the minds towards the 
achievement of a common objective in revising the test and implementing it uniformly. It 
seems almost like the natural order of things and processes that that which differs would 
invariably draw together in the quest for harmony and uniformity. Where such concepts are 
rooted in the law, whether of civilian or common law in character, this may prove to be an 
arduous task. 
Arrest is a powerful weapon. It is not dependant on there being an arguable claim or 
that the judgement may not be met.  
Jackson is of the view that if the arrest is itself malicious, or has been made in respect 
of a malicious claim, damages may be awarded under malicious prosecution. Furthermore, in 
the event of an arrest made despite the existence of a caution, damages may be awarded.
168
 
According to Meeson the judgements of The Kommunar No 3 in the United Kingdom 
and the Chaleur Fertilizers judgement in Canada provide hints that the rule established in The 
Evangelismos should be changed, but in both judgments the test of mala fides or crassa 
negligentia was nonetheless applied.
169
 
The court in Chaleur Fertilizers, while considering the argument put forward in 
Nossal’s article, remained of the view that any changes to the law falls within the scope of the 
legislature and not the courts, and this is the method whereby perceived failings in The 
Evangelismos rule have been corrected in Australia.
170
 
The decision of the court in the Kommunar No 3 and its application of the test for 
damages as laid down in The Evangelismos is affirmed by many commentators as the correct 
test to apply. The provisions of the test in The Evangelismos appear to be entrenched and 
clearly any departure therefrom will be fraught with difficulty, especially in the context of 
competing interpretations and agendas. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE ARREST CONVENTIONS 
 International Arrest Conventions I
There are currently two international conventions in existence relating to the arrest of ships. 
These are the International Convention Relation to the Arrest of Sea-Going Ships finalised at 
Brussels on the 10 May 1952 (“the 1952 Arrest Convention”) and the International 
Convention of Arrest of Ships done at Geneva (“the 1999 Arrest Convention”). The issue of 
wrongful arrest was addressed in both Conventions, with much debate between the parties.  
The common law countries owe the origins of their test for wrongful arrest of ships to 
the test as laid down in The Evangelismos, while the civil law countries hold the arresting 
party liable when it is proved that the arrest was unjustified. 
 The 1952 Arrest Convention II
Article 6 of the 1952 Arrest Convention states that: 
‘All questions whether in any case the claimant is liable in damages for the arrest of a 
ship or for the costs of the bail or other security furnished to release or prevent the arrest 
of a ship, shall be determined by the law of the Contracting State in whose jurisdiction the 
arrest was made or applied for.’ 
The 1952 Arrest Convention provides that the rules of procedure relating to the arrest 
of a ship, to the application for obtaining the authority referred to in article 4, and all matters 
of procedure which the arrest may entail, shall be governed by the law of the Contracting 
State in which the arrest was made or applied for.  
At the CMI Naples Conference of 1951, the associations of Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden objected to the provision whereby the issue of wrongful arrest was subject to the 
rules of the lex fori, and submitted a proposal in terms of which, save in exceptional cases, 
the claimant would have to provide security, the nature and amount of which would be fixed 
by the court, and should the arrest then prove to be unjustified, the claimant would be liable 
for the payment of damages.
171
 The proposal was not supported by any other association, thus 
lending credence to the view that even amongst civil law countries there were differing 
views. 
It is evident that even as far back as 1951, the suggestion of an arrest subject to the 
condition of security being secured in order to create a reasonable balance between the parties 
and relieve the harshness of a one sided test, was present. 
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According to Berlingieri, where an arrest is wrongful a claimant may be held liable in 
damages. However, the situations under which such liability may arise differ from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
The issue of whether the Convention should contain a provision on the right of the 
owner of an arrested ship to claim damages in the event of wrongful arrest was a matter of 
controversy and fiercely debated. The civil law countries were mostly in favour of this 
provision and the common law countries against.
172
 “ The difference of view being a product 
of different tests applied in the different legal systems.”
173
 
The Convention in seeking to find a solution to the debate between the civil and 
common law jurisdictions was to leave the matter to be determined by the lex fori. 
The 1952 Convention remains in force in 77 countries, with the United Kingdom being 
a signatory to the Convention. 
 The 1999 Arrest Convention III
The 1999 Arrest Convention states as follows: 
Article 6: Protection of Owners and Demise Charterers of Arrested Ships 
1. The court may as a condition of the arrest of a ship, or of permitting an arrested 
already effected to be maintained, impose upon the claimant who seeks to arrest or 
who has procured the arrest of the ship the obligation to provide security of a kind 
and for an amount, and upon such terms, as may be determined by that court for 
any loss which may be incurred by the defendant as a result of the arrest, and for 
which the claimant may be found liable including but not restricted to such loss or 
damage as may be incurred by that defendant in consequence of:  
(a) the arrest having been wrongful or unjustified, or 
(b) excessive security having been demanded and provided.  
2. The courts of the State in which an arrest has been effected shall have jurisdiction 
to determine the extent of the liability, if any, of the claimant for loss or damage 
caused by the arrest of a ship, including but not restricted to such loss or damage 
as may be caused in consequence of: 
(a) The arrest having been wrongful or unjustified, or 
(b) Excessive security having been demanded and provided. 
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3. The liability, if any, of the claimant in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article 
shall be determined by application of the law of State where the arrest was 
effected. 
4. If a court in another State or an arbitral tribunal is to determine the merits of the 
case in accordance with the provisions of Article 7, then proceedings relating to 
the liability of the claimant in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article may be 
stayed pending that decision. 
5. Where pursuant to paragraph 1 of the article security has been provided, the person 
providing such security may at any time apply to the court to have that security 
reduced, modified or cancelled. 
At the Lisbon Conference the issue was debated between the participants and the CMI 
International Sub-committee on the issue of whether uniform rules should be provided in 
respect of the obligation of the arrestor to provide security and the liability of the arrestor in 
the event of wrongful arrest.
174
 
A major objective of the 1999 Convention is to achieve a balance between the interests 
of claimants and owners. In order for an owner to be successful in an application for 
wrongful arrest, it would have to prove that the arrest is wrongful or unjustified.
175
 Her view 
is that these words could be interpreted to mean that there was no legal ground for the arrest 
and it was therefore wrongful or unjustified, considered objectively without reference to the 
belief of the arrestor. The arrestor ought therefore to take reasonable care to find out whether 
there were reasonable grounds for the arrest. 
The argument in support of a diminished threshold in relation to the higher standard of 
malice or crassa negligentia is based on the premise that since unjustified is defined in the 
dictionary
176
 as “wrong, indefensible, unacceptable, outrageous, unjust, unwarrantable”; that 
such words imply that the conduct in question is to be judged objectively by applying a 
standard of what a reasonable man would have done had he been in the position of the 
arrestor at the time of the arrest.
177
  
As the underlying premise of the Convention is to balance the interests of the parties, it 
may be understood that the intention of the drafter was to establish the test of a lower 
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threshold than that of malice or crassa negligentia.
178
 The Convention also makes provision 
for an undertaking in damages to be provided by the arrestor which is aligned to the 
underlying rationale of balancing the interests of the parties. 
While the 1952 Arrest Convention provides that the issue of a cross-undertaking of 
security for damages is a matter for determination by the lex fori, the 1999 Convention allows 
courts discretionary powers in this regard. The proposal put forward by the associations of 
Finland, Norway, and Sweden in 1998 is very similar to the suggestion put forth by Sir 
Bernard Eder in 2013, which is one of a cross-undertaking in security in respect of damages.  
The meaning and use of the word ‘unjustified’ in the drafting of the 1999 Convention 
was subject to much debate between the parties with the German contingent supporting its 
retention while the United Kingdom sought to have it removed. The word remained in Article 
6 following the United Kingdoms’ withdrawal of its objection.  
So what does the phrase (?) ‘wrongful or unjustified’ mean in the context of Article 6? 
‘The answer appears to be that it means a variety of things to a variety of States and that there 
is no unified approach taken to wrongful arrest by the international community.’
179
  
During the debate in respect of the use of the word ‘unjustified’ in Article 6, the Iranian 
delegate commented as follows:  
‘It seems to me that when we are drafting the Convention we should clarify and should go 




This view seems to favour an approach that the Convention should be clearer and more 
accurate in not only providing the test but also to provide clarity as to how to interpret the 
test, rather than leaving it to the discretion of the court to determine, which, it remains trite to 
say, will vary from state to state. 
According to William Tetley, Article 6 (2) enabled courts to award damages for the 
distinct categories of wrongful arrest, unjustified arrest, or excessive security claimed. 
‘These provisions are an important recognition of the need to sanction arrests inspired by 
bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of the claimant (in other words 
“wrongful arrests”, as understood in the United Kingdom, United States, Canada and 
other countries of common law tradition). The Convention goes further however in also 
permitting damages to be assessed and counter security to be imposed in respect of 
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“unjustified arrest (in other words arrest effected erroneously without proper legal 
foundation, but not motivated by bad faith or gross negligence). This position is taken by 
many civilian jurisdictions. Common law jurisdictions on the other hand have tended to 
award costs for bona fide arrest effected by simple mistake of law. The final text appears 
to have enshrined the civilian rule.’
181
 
This extract clearly establishes the distinction between common law states such as the 
United Kingdom, Singapore and Canada who employ the criteria of bad faith, malice or gross 
negligence, and who usually award costs for bona fide arrest effected by mistake of law, and 
civil law jurisdictions who allow for damages to be assessed and counter security to be 
demanded in instances where arrest may have been effected by error or mistake but not 
effected for underlying reasons of malice or gross negligence. The outcome of the debate has 
resulted in the final text of the 1999 Convention adhering to the approach of civilian states, 
and the provisions of the Convention allowing for the use of the lex fori.
182
 
If the common law states were to abandon the standards of mala fides and gross 
negligence and become signatories to the 1999 Convention, the dilemma of a non standard 
approach to the wrongful arrest of vessels would be resolved, and ultimately the application 
of the test may approach a level of uniformity that would be practical and in step with the 
demands of commercial shipping activity. 
The interpretation of Article 6(2) by Woodford is that it does not limit the class of 
potential claimants of damages for wrongful arrest. The requirement for application of this 




The 1999 Convention has come into force in 2011 on the accession of the tenth state 
being Albania.  
According to Ruiz Abou Nigm, allegedly Member states of the European Union may 
not individually ratify the 1999 Convention on the basis that it contains jurisdictional 
provisions which would affect the rules contained in the Brussels I Convention. Ratification 
or accession would have to be effected by the European Union as a single entity. The 
accession of the European Union as a single entity to the 1999 Arrest Convention would 
serve to establish jurisdictional uniformity and the equal application of justice in the 
                                                 
 
181
 Tetley 1970-1. 
182
 Berlingieri 534. 
183
 Woodford 129. 
50 
European Union. If this happens as anticipated, then this will consolidate a balanced special 
jurisdictional scheme for maritime claims,
184
 and advance the enforcement of maritime 
claims in Europe. 
 How does this impact on the test for wrongful arrest? IV
In the pursuit of harmonisation and consistency in the law, accession to the 1999 Arrest 
Convention may provide the least complicated method of achieving uniformity. While 
encouraging this position, it comes with the caveat that while accession to the 1999 




By analogy, as the pursuit of uniformity has initiated reform in other areas of the law 
such as limitation of liability, ship owners’ liabilities and international trade, why not 
Admiralty law. 
The CMI international subcommittee and the Lisbon Conference debated the issue of 
whether uniform rules would be required in respect of the obligation of the arrestor to provide 
security and of his liability in respect of wrongful arrest.
186
 
The reasons which existed previously which prevented the establishment of such a rule 
in the 1952 Convention were still in existence.  
‘It was therefore decided not to regulate the substantive aspects of the matter but 
specifically to give the court power to impose security and jurisdiction in respect of the 
assessment of liability for wrongful or unjustified arrest.’
187
 
The court referred to is that in which the arrest is sought. The person in whose favour 
security may be granted is the defendant, which term presupposes the existence or imminent 
commencement of proceedings on the merits of the case between the arrestor and the person 
liable for the maritime claim in respect of which the arrest is sought.
188
  
Berlingieri draws attention to the fact that this is not the only possible scenario. Under 
article 7 jurisdiction on the merits is granted, alternatively to the courts of the State in which 
the ship has been arrested and to the courts of the state in which security has been provided to 
obtain the release of the ship which may in fact be a state other than the state in which the 
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arrest was initially effected.
189
 Equally courts may have refused to exercise jurisdiction or the 
parties may have agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of another state or even to arbitration. 
The achievement of harmonisation of laws in this regard by the amending of the 1999 
Convention by way of a Protocol may provide a solution.
190
  
At the level of the International Maritime Committee (“CMI”)  and other international 
maritime bodies a possible solution may be for the states seeking a change in the United 
Kingdom legislation to actively lobby for the United Kingdom to change its stance in respect 
of the issue and negotiate further toward a compromise or mutually acceptable solution, 
which if properly negotiated and defined could be ultimately regarded as a win-win situation 
for all parties.
191
   
The test for wrongful arrest used by common law states has its origins in the test 
established in The Evangelismos while civil law systems hold the arrestor responsible 
whenever it is proved that the arrest was unjustified. The Conventions both 1999 and 1952 in 
addressing this, appear to avoid direct resolution by leaving the issue to be dealt with by the 
lex fori. In so doing how can there ever be harmonisation of laws, as each state will apply and 
interpret the law differently, which is the current position.  
Australia has determined not to be a signatory to either of the Arrest Conventions. The 
Australian Law Reform Commission indicated that Australia has not ratified the 1952 Arrest 
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CHAPTER 6 ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF, AND AGAINST, CHANGE 
 The movement for reform I
The issue at hand was crisply defined by Sir Bernard Eder as: ‘the right of a ship owner to 
claim compensation for loss caused by the detention of the owner’s ship while under 
arrest.’
193
 Sir Eder has campaigned for over 30 years to change the law and the approach of 
the courts in respect of the issue of wrongful arrest.  
This view gained greater momentum following the article written by Professor 
Mandaraka-Sheppard in 2013,
 194
 which led to an article by Sir Bernard Eder, a response by 
Martin Davies, and a rejoinder by Sir Eder. This has served to shine a spotlight on the 
contentious and varied approaches to wrongful arrest and the application of the test or not by 
jurisdictions world-wide and has prompted the CMI to establish an International Working 
Group with the objective of establishing uniformity and harmonisation of the law. 
The position remains one of the issue above being determined by the law of the 
contracting state in whose jurisdiction the arrest was either made or where the arrest was 
applied for. 
Since mala fides or crass negligentia are the only grounds for the awarding of damages 
in English law where a ship owner has suffered loss by way of an unjustifiable arrest but is 
unable to establish mala fides or crassa negligentia means that such a ship owner may be 
without a remedy. The onus of discharging this evidentiary burden is generally considered to 
be extremely difficult especially in the modern age, bearing in mind that the test was 
established in the 1858 decision of The Evangelismos. ‘The need for reform has been 
recognised by commentators who see no justification in the different procedural treatment 
given to ship arrest and freezing orders in this context.’
195
 
The availability of a variety of jurisdictions, and the opportunities and disadvantages 
each offers, inevitably leads to the practice of forum shopping. The potential for injustice and 
manipulation and inconsistencies in judgements have established a call for the harmonisation 
of domestic laws in respect of this subject.
196
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The judgement in The Kommunar (No 3)
197
 adds impetus to the call for a review and 
change to this area of the law. In this case, the defendant ship owner sought to recover 
damages for the wrongful arrest of the vessel. The claim was dismissed but the comments of 
Colman J were of significance, in pointing out the inherent characteristic of the action in rem 
which is to not require an undertaking in damages from a plaintiff who has obtained the 
benefit of security for his claim by arresting a vessel. Regardless of the success of the 
plaintiffs claim he will not have to compensate the ship owner for expenses or losses incurred 
unless mala fides or crassa negligentia is proved thus creating an inequitable situation for 
ship owners.  
Even if the plaintiffs claim fails or his is found to have wrongly invoked the jurisdiction 
he will not have to compensate the ship owner for the expenses and losses arising out of the 
arrest unless mala fides or crassa negligentia is proved. This will create difficulties for ship 
owners who are unable to put up the security for the release of their vessel. This rule does not 
apply in civil law systems. In English law the Mareva injunction is widely used for obtaining 
security for a claim in personam operates to provide security but an undertaking for damages 
is required and the liability for that undertaking will surface should the underlying claim fail, 
and thereby render the plaintiff liable for all losses caused by the injunction.
198
 
The judge was of the view that, the lack of a similar approach in in rem proceedings has 
the effect of leaving an innocent defendant ship owner who having suffered loss by an 
unjustifiable arrest and in addition, also unable to establish malice or crass negligentia, now 
being devoid of a remedy.
199
 
The problem thus appears to be the nature of the action in rem in its treatment of the 
test for wrongful arrest, and is considered by Sir Eder as placing a would be arrestor in a 
privileged position, in that it does not have to establish a link to found jurisdiction, and the 
owner is then in an untenable position because there is no cross-undertaking for security for 
damages, in the event of wrongful arrest.
200
 
According to Professor Mandaraka-Sheppard, in her argument in support of the reform 
of the law in relation to wrongful arrest, the fact that the test to determine the wrongfulness of 
arrest was formulated in very different conditions from the current conditions and that it has 
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not been critically examined in the context of modern commercial litigation is in itself a 
reason for the reassessment of the test.
201
 This is a very cogent argument and the validity 
thereof should be recognised in the event of the next opportunity that may arise in 
commercial litigation where wrongful arrest is in issue. 
The test could have been critically examined by the Canadian Appeal Court in the 
Chaleur Fertiliser case,
202
 but the court determined instead, that this was a matter best dealt 
with by the Legislature, and consequently declined to revise the test. 
Claimants who seek damages for wrongful arrest of their ships are often one-ship 
owners, who face the constant risk of their asset either being sold or lost at sea.
203
 
The stringent nature of the test for wrongful arrest under English law operates in effect 
by practically providing claimants with immunity from being sued for damages since they 
know the owner of the arrested vessel will be discouraged from seeking damages for 
wrongful arrest. 
The following instances are examples of where claimants have sought to abuse the right 
to arrest: by making unreasonable demands for excessive security; refusing to accept an 
undertaking from the owners P&I club, and continuing the arrest until the arrestors demands 
were met; failing to thoroughly interrogate the basis or foundation for the arrest; where the 
claimant lacks the requisite standing to arrest the ship; where the ship was not in the 
beneficial ownership of the alleged defendant.
204
 
In such situations, the owner has been unable to discharge the burden of proof, except 
in certain exceptional cases that the arrestor acted mala fides or crassa negligentia. 
The court commented in the Kommunar No 3 that to characterise the proceedings and 
the arrest as without reasonable and probable cause would be putting the threshold for crassa 
negligentia too low.
205
 According to Professor Mandaraka-Sheppard, what the court meant is 
that without an assessment of the subject state of mind of the arrestor the threshold would be 
too low.
206
 This state of confusion, referred to earlier, must be considered in the context of 
the interpretation of the test in the Walter D Wallet where the concept of ‘without reasonable 
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or probable cause’ is adopted from common law malicious prosecution cases and has been 
equated to crassa negligentia.
207
  
The view is that ‘without reasonable or probable cause’ in the Admiralty context should 
mean that there are no reasonable grounds for the arrest and or the cause of the arrest is likely 
to fail.
208
 Where the expression ‘without reasonable or probable cause’ is used ‘confusion 
arises because different meanings can be ascribed to it.
209
 Reasons of uniformity and justice 
require that this outdated test is abandoned’.
210
 
The procedural background against which The Evangelismos was decided has changed 
and the law in other jurisdictions has evolved to keep pace with the challenges of commercial 
reality. 
The civil law test used for malicious prosecutions and then applied to wrongful arrest 
has caused confusion. The reason why this is so, is because of the varying terminology and 
definitions which give rise to inconsistency in the application of the law. 
Sir Eder’s view regarding the introduction of a cross undertaking in damages is 
supported by Professor Jackson who views the test as a somewhat one-sided practice in the 
context of the opposite and regular imposition of a cross-undertaking where a person is 
seeking a Mareva injunction.
211
  
‘The conceptual and jurisprudential association between ship arrest and the in rem claim 
has thus many disadvantages: it creates confusion between the different function of ship 
arrest: the protective function, on the one side, and the jurisdictional function on the other 
side by making ship arrest dependant on merits jurisdiction. This linkage has especially 
undermined the correct application of the 1952 International Arrest Convention in 
English law. In the opinion of Jackson the intricacies of English law in this respect show 
the “schizophrenic” approach of English law to maritime claims.’
212
  
According to Professor Mandaraka-Sheppard, the test established in The Evangelismos 
having been based on the criminal law concept of malicious prosecution, pre-dates the 
evolution of the delict of negligence and is outdated thus leading to confusion and conflicting 
judgments.
213
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The argument in favour of reform of the test for the wrongful arrest of ships is simply 
that the test in civil cases for wrongful arrest of ships should be an objective test and should 
be based on whether or not there were reasonable grounds for the arrest.
214
 
 Arguments in favour of change II
The economic climate and jurisdictional background during which The Evangelismos was 
decided is not applicable in this present day. The courts have remained bound by the decision 
and continued to apply the test as set down therein, even as recent decisions above have 
shown, the test in The Evangelismos may be outdated but certainly not abandoned.  
(a) Basis for test out-dated 
Since the test is derived from the test for the delict of malicious prosecution, it has caused 
confusion. However the test in delict has been adapted to suit present times therefore there is 
no reason why this should not be the same approach in Admiralty.
215
  
(b) Inconsistent application of test 
The test for wrongful arrest in Admiralty has been inconsistently applied. The courts have 
awarded damages for wrongful arrest of a ship without there being mala fides. In these 
matters, the arrestor was unsuccessful in the claim on the merits. Other instances have seen 
the owner being awarded only costs and not damages as no mala fides or crassa negligentia 
was evident.  
(c) Awarding damages and a cross undertaking in security 
Damages have been awarded in the following cases where the test of mala fides or crassa 
negligentia was fulfilled. 
In the matter of The Kos,
216
 the Court allowed for the costs incurred by an owner in 
putting up security to avoid arrest as recoverable on the basis of being costs incidental to the 
proceedings. Therefore, if this precedent is followed ship owners under threat of arrest who 
put up a guarantee to avoid arrest may be able to recover the costs incurred in procuring that 
guarantee should the arrestor be unsuccessful in obtaining the arrest of the vessel. 
If, however he fails to put up a guarantee, due to financial or other limitations and the 
vessel is then arrested there is no prospect of being awarded damages or any other 
recompense unless he is able to prove mala fides or crassa negligentia. According to the 
argument put forward by Sir Eder this is an unjustifiable anomaly, and this raises the question 
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therefore as to why should the ship owner be in a worse position purely due to financial 
constraints preventing him putting up security.
217
 
While appreciating that should a ship owner be entitled by right to claim damages for 
wrongful arrest due to substantive reasons put forward by the court or in the event of the 
claim being abandoned may be taking the position too far, he proposes that a court may 
require a ‘cross undertaking in damages from the claimant as a precondition of lending its 
assistance to the arrest of the relevant ship’.
218
 
The cross-undertaking to provide security for damages is a standard requirement in any 
application for any injunction, and equity therefore requires an undertaking, bond or other 
safeguard. 
The practice of the English Admiralty Court has never been to require a cross-
undertaking in damages from the party seeking the arrest.
219
 Furthermore, neither can it be 
conclusively argued that the authorities prohibit the Admiralty court from seeking a cross 
undertaking for the claimant as a precondition of the court acceding to the claimants request 
for the issuance and execution of the warrant of arrest. ‘It is because the law does not permit 
a claim for damages to lie absent mala fides or crassa negligentia that I would suggest that a 
cross undertaking in damages should be required.’
220
 
In response to an argument that cross-undertakings would potentially be impracticable, 
he is of the view that he can see no reason at present why there should be any practical 
difficulty in a procedure which requires a cross-undertaking in damages from the claimant.
221
 
Further to the allusion to forum shopping referred to in the beginning of this 
dissertation, it stands to reason that a requirement for a cross-undertaking will clearly operate 
to discourage potential litigants from selecting a particular jurisdiction where this is a 
requirement. But at worst it is an economic reason and not a legal reason. 
(d) Access to courts 
The inordinately high threshold founded by the component criteria of mala fides or crassa 
negligentia has functioned as a deterrent to accessing or approaching the courts by any party 
and its vessel that has been the victim of wrongful arrest. The dearth of judgements 
emanating from United Kingdom courts, referred to in Chapter 4, stands as proof sufficient of 
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the reluctance to approach a United Kingdom court, or any court known for its rigid 
application of the test in The Evangelismos, for the adjudication of such matters, and the 
award of damages.  
Thus, apart from the economic loss, and loss of profit and commercial viability that 
stand as the risks facing ship owners, or disponent charterers, in the event of wrongful arrest 
the ship owner or disponent charterer in its pursuit of justice is then faced with the challenge 
that the somewhat insurmountable test for wrongful arrest in respect of which it bears the 
onus also means that its access to court is limited or curtailed.  
Unlike any other litigant who approaches the court knowing full well his prospects of 
success may be at best a 50/50 chance of success, a ship owner who has had his vessel 
wrongfully arrested is deterred from approaching a court at all, thus not even able to avail 
himself of the right of access to justice, never mind what the outcome of exposure to that 
justice might be.  
The right to access to courts may also be interpreted as the right of a claimant seeking 
to arrest a vessel to secure or satisfy his claim being discouraged from approaching a court by 
being labelled malicious in seeking to arrest a ship, despite having a valid claim. 
‘The arrest of ships is a recognised feature of international maritime commerce and 
international maritime jurisdiction. Very often legitimate claims will go unsatisfied unless 
there is recourse to an effective and efficient system of maritime arrest.’
222
 
Furthermore, any potential applicant seeking recompense for wrongful arrest may be 
discouraged by the potential for damages due should they be unable to prove either the mala 
fides or crassa negligentia in the conduct of the other party in order for their claim to be 
successful. 
Another facet of this argument is that if damages were to be awarded for the wrongful 
arrest of a ship or cargo without having to fulfil the requirements of fault or gross negligence 
would this then discourage plaintiffs from bringing ‘bona fide actions in rem’.
223
 
The response to this view is in the affirmative as strict liability for wrongful arrest 
would provide a disincentive to initiate the arrest procedure.
224
 This does not, however, take 
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into consideration that courts must balance the interests of the plaintiff against those of the 
defendants, and not simply maximise opportunities for plaintiffs to bring claims.
225
 
Whilst damages may be minimised by the defendant agreeing to post security there 
should be no actual requirement that compels it to do so and such security then only serves to 
reduce the quantum of damage suffered.
226
 
If the changes to the test being lobbied for are successful it would establish and 
equitable and reasonable test, and create certainty and uniformity in the law, curtail forum 
shopping, improve access to courts [specifically for the ship interests] without having a dual 
burden of overcoming the onus established by a stringent test and the possibility of damages 
should the application for wrongful arrest be unsuccessful, and allow for a cross undertaking 
in damages. 
 Argument(s) against change III
The sentiments expressed in Crawford Adjusters v Sagicor General Insurance (Cayman) 
Ltd,
227
 by the presiding officer are that:  
‘Clearly it cannot be open to every successful defendant to round upon his unsuccessful 
claimant or prosecutor, no matter how great the collateral damage. Defining the 
circumstances in which he can do so is fraught with difficulty…’.
228
 
These words appear to be quite sensible and logical. The consideration of awarding 
damages would become a reality if it is plainly evident that the plaintiffs claim would not be 
successful on the merits, and any form of legal proceedings would be apparent as vexatious in 
nature. It appears to be a fine line between this position and awarding damages whenever a 
plaintiff’s claim is unsuccessful. 
In the matter of Compania Financiera v Hamoor Tanker Corporation (The Borag),
229
 
the managers of a vessel had undertaken the management of a ship; in the course of a dispute 
the managers had the ship arrested in Cape Town. The owners obtained a bank guarantee to 
secure its release and sought the return of the interest payments on the overdraft it incurred in 
order to provide the security of a guarantee. This was granted by the trial court. On appeal, 
the court held that the expenditure was damages, not the mitigation of damages. It was 
therefore too remote to be accepted as foreseeable. The court in upholding the appeal held: ‘It 
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is not every consequence of a wrongful act which is the subject of compensation. The law has 
to draw a line somewhere.’
230
  
The significance of this comment is that a court will not blindly grant damages in 
respect of expenses incurred in the event of wrongful arrest, and implies, rightly so, that 
every situation will be weighed up and considered on the basis of the facts, the law and the 
competing interests of the parties before the court. 
 To reform or to delay IV
In addressing the Mareva injunction analogy used by Sir Eder in relation to wrongful arrest, 
the argument against this is that if no security is provided by the ship owner, a ship arrest 
affects only one of the ship owner’s assets only until security is provided. The argument is 
that the remainder of the ship owners business continues as normal.
231
 
This would be appropriate of course where the ship owner is the owner of more than 
one asset, and the arrest of one vessel may not necessarily give rise to any prejudice to the 
remainder of the business, and furthermore any possible economic loss may be offset or 
absorbed by the use of other ships or assets. 
Unification of the law and the test for the wrongful arrest of ships and cargo will leave 
an unscrupulous individual without the option of forum shopping. Harmony and certainty in 
the law will ensure that any party with a hidden agenda will be unable to effect any nefarious 
motives. 
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CHAPTER 7 THE CMI AND THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP 
 CMI I
The study into the issue of liability for wrongful arrest was initiated following a presentation 
at the CMI Conference in Hamburg, 2013, by Dr Aleka Mandaraka-Sheppard entitled 
‘Wrongful Arrest of Ships: A Case for Reform’.
232
 The position in English law as established 
by the decision in The Evangelismos was outlined and compared with common and civil law 
jurisdictions and a proposition was made for the reform of the English law position and also 
the international reform of the law in this area.
233
 
 The International Working Group II
(a) Constitution of working group 
The Comite Maritime Internationale (CMI) constituted an International Working Group
234
 
(IWG) following the presentation of Mandaraka- Sheppard, to prepare a Questionnaire into 
how the subject of wrongful arrest was dealt with in both civil and common law jurisdictions, 
with Mandaraka-Sheppard as Rapporteur and Georgio Berlingieri as Chair. 
(b) Questionnaire  
The contents of the Questionnaire were drafted, debated and thereafter finalised and 
circulated to the various National Maritime Law Associations, (NMLAs).
235
 The purpose of 
the study was to identify the similarities and differences among the various legal systems so 
that the CMI-IWG can develop a draft set of rules with the objective of harmonisation of the 
laws on wrongful arrest.
236
 The CMI website included a new section containing the relevant 
and supporting documents in relation to the study. 
The IWG was joined by Sir Bernard Eder whose stance in respect of advocating a 
chatnge to the law in this area spanned 30 years. His position in relation to this subject is that 
the English Courts should revise the test established by The Evangelismos or that the 
arresting party be compelled to provide a cross undertaking in damages as a precondition of 
any arrest as one would ordinarily do in the instance of applying for an injunction.
237
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(c) International Arrest Conventions 
The Chair of the International Working Group of the Comite Maritime International 
acknowledges in the CMI Yearbook 2015 that the 1952 and 1999 Arrest Conventions do not 
provide uniform rules on the test for wrongful arrest and the award of damages consequent 
upon such wrongful arrest.
238
 
Article 6 of the 1952 Convention makes a general reference to the law of the State 
where the arrest occurred; i.e. the lex fori.
239
 The equivalent clause in the 1999 Convention 
adds very little to the provisions of the 1952 Convention by way of allocating powers to the 
Court to impose security and jurisdiction in order to establish the liability that may exist if 
any, for losses or damages that may have been incurred which are wrongful or unjustified or 
even in instances of excessive security being demanded and given.
240
  
(d) Responses to questionnaire 
Following the receipt of the responses received as at the time of the publication of the 2015 
CMI Yearbook, some preliminary observations included that although there was much 
variation at national levels, there were also a large number of States with a certain degree of 
uniformity and amongst whom there could not be said to be a significant variance in rules. 
Subject to the receipt of further outstanding responses from other NMLAs, as at 2015, 
and the development of the debate regarding the subject at later conferences the CMI 
anticipated that the IWG may evolve into an International Sub-Committee to enable all 
NMLAs to contribute significantly to the issues and thereafter the IWG would draft a uniform 
set of rules on liability for wrongful arrest.
241
  
These draft rules would then be incorporated into a protocol to the 1999 Arrest 
Convention or in to a model law or other instrument for its ratification, promulgation and 
implementation into national legislation of the various member countries. 
Responses were eventually received from 36 NMLAs.
242
 
(e) Analysis of Responses by CMI 
(i) Application of specific conventions or national law 
The analysis revealed that 17 of the 38 respondent countries apply the 1952 Arrest 
Convention- these are Belgium, Croatia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, 
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Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Ukraine and United 
Kingdom; 2 of the 38 responding countries apply the 1999 Arrest Convention- these are 
Spain and Norway; 10 of the 38 countries apply one or the other of the adopted conventions 
in conjunction with their national laws- these are Brazil, Croatia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Poland, Romania, Russia, Spain and Turkey; 16 of the 38 countries apply only their 
domestic legislation- Australia, Canada, Chile, Columbia, DPRK, Equador, Japan, Israel, 
Korea, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, USA. 
(ii) Security for arrest 
According to the questionnaire counter security for arrest was provided for in 11 of the 38 
countries which require the arrestor to provide counter security in order to obtain an order for 
the arrest or to maintain the arrest- these are Croatia, Finland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, 
Netherlands, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Spain and Turkey. 
No security is required in13 of the 38 countries, viz. Australia, Brazil, Canada,    
Ecuador, France, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand, Panama, United 
Kingdom and the USA. 
The provision of security is subject to the discretion of the court in 13 countries; these 
countries are Belgium, Chile, Colombia, Germany, Italy, Malta, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, 
Poland, Portugal, South Africa, and Ukraine. 
(iii) Test for liability in the event of wrongful arrest: 
Strict Liability is applied in 9 of the 38 countries. These are Croatia, Finland, Germany, 
Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Spain. 
In requiring proof of negligence, 10 of the 38 countries generally apply tort rules, in 
respect of negligence for wrongful arrest- these are Belgium, Brazil, Chile, DPRK, Japan, 
Korea, Panama, Portugal, Senegal, Ukraine 
Proof of gross negligence, bad faith, malice is required in Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Korea, Malta, New Zealand, Panama, Senegal, South Africa, UK, 
USA. 
(iv) Differences in formulations of test 
The CMI Yearbook also makes reference to other phrases used to describe the test for 
wrongful arrest, which may not be expressed in strict legal terms. Furthermore, while the 
terminology differs between each country, it is subject to the explanation or lack of 
explanation specified in the responses.  
64 
It could mean that the owner of the arrested vessel has to prove negligence on the part 
of the arrestor or even that gross negligence or malice has to be proved, and if so this would 
involve an objective and subjective element of the test. 
These phrases are: illicit or unjustified arrest in Ecuador and Turkey; unreasonable or 
without good cause arrest in Australia and Nigeria; without reasonable and probable cause in 
South Africa; frivolous or vexatious arrest in Malta; abuse of rights such as vexatious arrest 
in Romania and France; without ordinary prudence in Italy; wrongful behaviour in Ukraine; 
wrongful or unjustified in North Korea; and, arrest obtained by false evidence on the 
application for arrest where the arrestor was aware or due to gross negligence he ignored that 
the claim did not exist as applied in Greece. 
(v) Conclusions  
The Rapporteur concluded her analysis by noting an evident disparity and lack of alignment 
in the answers received to the Questionnaire. The differences were not only between civil and 
common law jurisdictions but also within civil law countries. 
 The way forward? III
The role of the CMI is a significant and crucial one in that it seeks to unify laws and establish 
harmonisation, and it is within the scope of this aim that the IWG continues to canvass the 
views of the NMLAs, in order to proceed toward the achieving of unification and 
harmonisation of laws. 
In the context of international shipping and the various competing interests, economic, 
financial and commercial that characterise the shipping industry, the IWG may be the best 
hope for progress in modifying and improving this area of the law, at the very least by 
providing a forum for dialogue and discourse of the issues. 
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 
According to Woodford,
243
 the 1895 decision of The Village Bell was the last of the 
nineteenth century cases where the issue of damages for wrongful arrest arose. The next case 




The implication of this comment is that the development of the law relating to the issue 
of damages for the wrongful arrest of vessels was firmly established and not in dispute.
245
 
The position thus remained static for seventy six years, which implies that there were also 
very few matters involving wrongful arrest that were reported which perhaps raises the 
question as to whether potential litigants were discouraged from approaching a court for 
relief knowing the severity of the threshold they would be required to overcome was 
somewhat daunting. 
The test as established in The Evangelismos has been used in various common law 
states but not necessarily uniformly applied, with differing interpretations, both narrow and 
broad being evident from the case law referred to in previous chapters. South Africa and 
Australia have statutorily established tests for wrongful arrest, which do not involve malice or 
crassa negligentia, as established in The Evangelismos 
The mechanism of ship arrest in Admiralty and the maritime industry is a unique and 
powerful remedy. The concept of wrongful arrest has been regarded as a means of preventing 
the misuse and abuse of the right of arrest. Wrongful arrest, if proven, enables a court to 
award damages against the plaintiff in favour of the ship owner. The effectiveness of the 
concept of ship arrest is to a large extent if not entirely dependent on the courts to balance the 
interests of the ship owner and the interests of the arresting party.
246
  
‘If the principle of “wrongful arrest” is too widely defined it may undermine the 
claimant’s right of arrest by exposing him to damages for wrongful arrest, should his 
decision to arrest turn out to be wrongful. However, the right of arrest should not be made 
so onerous that claimants are afraid to make use of the legitimate right of arrest because 
of the potential exposure to damages for wrongful arrest. On the other hand if the 
                                                 
 
243
 Woodford 125. 
244
 [1971] 1 Lloyds Rep 502 (CA). 
245
 Woodford 125. 
246
 Chia Song Yeow https://rajahtann.co./eOASIS/II/pdf/wrongfularrest.pdf, accessed12 August 2017. 
66 
principle is defined too narrowly ship owners may not be adequately protected against 
abuse of the right of arrest.’
247
 
How then is this reform of the law governing wrongful arrest to be resolved? As 
commented on above, there are risks attendant on whether the test is too widely defined and 
if too onerous. The test survives over a large part of the world as a relic of colonialism and 
therefore means that it remains as part of established law via judicial precedent in numerous 
countries. The application of the lex fori means that variations of the test differ from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
There are arguments in favour of and against change. Should the test be revised and 
what is the mechanism to achieve this? 
The first suggested solution is via judicial initiative whereby it has been suggested that 
the English courts should revise the test. This could happen in the following ways: 
The first is that, while there are two Privy Council decisions in The Borag,
248
 and the 
Gulf Azov v Idisi,
249
 which are of strong persuasive value while not binding precedent, a 
Supreme Court decision in the United Kingdom would create the necessary precedent to 
change the test. A judge would have to take a bold approach in finding The Evangelismos test 
no longer pertinent or applicable and by distinguishing such a future case from The 
Evangelismos depart from the test.
250
 
Secondly, by requiring a cross-undertaking in damages as a pre-requisite for an arrest. 
The cross-undertaking in damages was suggested by Sir Eder as early as 1996 in promoting a 
change in English law by suggesting an undertaking in damages should be ordered by the 
court as a condition of arrest in the wrongful arrest of ships, as is the situation in interim 
injunctions.
251
 The use of this possible solution would be practical in compensating the owner 
for the loss caused by the arrest, for expenses incurred to put up security or where excessive 
security is demanded or where the claimant, as in the case of The Vasiliy Golovnin, uses 
duress in its tactics to compel the owner to agree to his preferred terms. 
Thirdly, Judges should consider adopting a test which is based on the negligence of the 
arrestor or alternately if the test of no reasonable or probable cause is fully defined so that it 
may be applied as an objective standard test which in effect means that there are no 
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reasonable grounds of arrest or that the case was more likely than not to fail, upon an 




‘Endorsing an old test on historical grounds is less than satisfactory, less than just and 
obstructs uniformity. The reform should aim for a test which must facilitate the balance of 
justice and enable uniformity in its application.’
253
 
Fifthly, by way of internal reform to the Civil Procedure Rules applicable in English 
law and introducing a cross undertaking in damages is a feasible option for the English 
jurisdiction. Combined with lowering the threshold for the test and providing clear definitions 
of the terms used will likely provide a balance between the interests of ship owners and 
claimants. Should none of these suggested changes reach fruition, accession to the 1999 
Convention and its ratification into domestic law may then provide the solution.
254
 
There is a prevalence of confusion and no uniformity in the application of the test for 
the wrongful arrest of ships.
255
 The English decisions which upheld wrongful arrest, are 
characterised by actual wrongful arrest on the facts of the matter, and there appeared to be no 
difficulty in meeting the higher standard test. Although it appears that this is the exception to 
the rule, and given the dearth of wrongful arrest cases for seventy six years, and the effluxion 
of time from one century to the next, the real problems arise in the application of the outdated 
existing harsh test to everyday cases.  
The test established in The Evangelismos serves to discourage ship owners with valid 
claims from pursuing wrongful arrest claims. ‘The fact that the test was formulated in very 
different conditions and has not been critically examined in the context of modern 
commercial litigation is itself a reason for its reassessment.’
256
  
Professor Mandaraka-Sheppard proposes that in achieving uniformity and 
harmonisation, the quickest and most effective method would be to accede to the 1999 Arrest 
Convention, or adopt it into their national law. In so doing, it would be appropriate and 
necessary to define the meaning of the words ‘wrongful’ and ‘unjustified’.
257
 An agreed 
definition of these words would certainly serve to improve clarity and create a common 
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understanding and this would ultimately lead to uniformity and harmonisation in the law to 
be applied. 
The search for uniformity in the establishment of international conventions and the 
promulgation and adherence thereto is not an entirely elusive one. The United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) is considered the most 
successful attempt to unify a broad area of commercial law internationally.
258
 Part of the 
appeal of this convention, which as at 2009 had attracted more than 70 contracting states 
accounting for over two thirds of the international trade in goods, is that contracting states 
may by agreement derogate from any rule of the Convention or exclude the Convention 
entirely in favour of another law. The CISG is a pertinent example of how international 
uniformity may be achieved.  
The international shipping trade environment and its associated practises, such as the 
test for wrongful arrest, can only benefit from some level of uniformity of interpretation or 
application by all states whether following a civil law or common law tradition. The CISG 
has proven that international conventions that promote uniform practises are not the Holy 
Grail, and a Protocol to the 1999 Arrest Convention may be the most appropriate solution in 
the circumstances in striving to breach the divide in the varied applications of the test for 
wrongful arrest of vessels. 
However, there seems to be little or no desire in the international shipping community 
to take the matter forward, and it appears that the work of the CMI may have consequently 
lost momentum. Bearing in mind that only 11 countries have acceded to the 1999 Convention 
- the last of which was in 2011 – then perhaps guidelines or a model law may be more 
effective.
259
 This apparent reluctance or perhaps frustration is echoed in the title of the report 
in the CMI Yearbook 2016: ‘Towards Uniform Rules on Wrongful Arrest or Still With The 
Law of the Jurisdiction Where the Arrest is made’.
260
 
The CMI chartered the way forward and has established the IWG to find possible 
solutions by co-operating with the NMLAs. An International Sub Committee is regarded as 
the vehicle to move forward by providing NMLAs with a platform or forum to contribute 
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meaningfully to this project and to ‘hopefully find uniformity, dictating general principles 
which may be valid in any law system.’
261
 
Regrettably, the reform of the test for the wrongful arrest of vessels, which is a 
commendable and much required objective, has been met with reluctance not only from 
industry members but also hesitancy from various jurisdictions in implementing any level of 
reform. The recent case law and judicial comment while recognising that the test requires 
reform, continues to be entrenched in supporting the relevance of and applying the test for 
wrongful arrest, and relinquishing the role of creating change to their respective legislatures.  
The need for change exists, it is simply consensus as to wording and interpretation, and 
most importantly commitment from both civil law and common law jurisdictions to find a 
common point of agreement for the change to become a reality, whether by way of a Protocol 
or model law. The International Working Group of the CMI is dedicated to the reform of the 
test, and appears to provide the best impetus in the circumstances to achieve an integrated 
solution with contributions solicited from NMLAs, which can be mutually acceptable to 
most, if not all parties, in the search for harmonisation and uniformity in reforming the test 
for the wrongful arrest of vessels. One can only hope that it will not be a search in vain. 
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